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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA BARBER,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 960783-CA

SAM JOHN BARBER, JR.

Civil No. 924901656 DA
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR,

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether

the

charitable

contributions

made

by

the

businesses in which Sam Barber owned an interest should be imputed
to Mr. Barber as income based on the trial court's findings that
Mr. Barber lacks the ability to withdraw the funds as salary and
that his business interests were valued based on the presumption
that the contributions would remain in the businesses. Standard of
Review:
When challenging a trial court!s findings of
fact, the party must "marshal all the evidence

supporting the trial court's findings and then
show the evidence
to be
legally
insufficient to support the findings." If the
party challenging the finding fails to marshal
the supporting evidence, the trial court's
finding will not be disturbed on appeal.
Breinholt

v. Breinholt.

(citations omitted).

905 P.2d

877, 882

(Utah App. 1995)

This issue was preserved in the trial court

as reflected by Finding of Fact No. 9.
II.

Whether the trial court erred in its factual findings

regarding the parties' incomes and expenses used to set alimony and
child support.

Standard of Review:

When challenging a trial court's findings of
fact, the party must "marshal all the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings and then
show the evidence to be
legally
insufficient to support the findings." If the
party challenging the finding fails to marshal
the supporting evidence, the trial court's
finding will not be disturbed on appeal.
Breinholt

v. Breinholt.

(citations omitted).

905 P.2d

877, 882

(Utah App. 1995)

This issue was preserved in the trial court

as reflected by Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51,
52, 53, and 54, and Sam John Barber's written closing arguments.
III. Whether the trial court correctly valued Sam Barber's
business interests.
regarding

Standard of review:

the parties' property

A trial court's actions

interests are entitled

to a

presumption of validity, thus, the trial court's valuation of
marital property will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion.
1995)

Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App.

The issue was preserved in the trial court reflected by the

Findings of Fact Nos. 17 through 45 and Sam John Barber's written
2

closing arguments.

IV.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony to

Plaintiff for a time period equal to the length of the parties'
marriage.

A trial court's decision regarding alimony and child

support will not be disturbed absent manifest injustice or inequity
that indicates a clear abuse of discretion.
P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1995).

Jensen v. Bowcutt. 892

Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209,

1211 (Utah App. 1991).

While the trial court's findings of fact in

divorce

reviewed

appeals

are

under

the

"clearly

erroneous

standard", its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and
given no special deference on appeal.
1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994).

Bingham v. Bingham 872 p.2d

The Plaintiff failed to preserve a

claim for alimony that would run longer than the term of the
parties' marriage in the lower court proceedings.
V.

Whether the Plaintiff's

intentional

acts in delaying

these proceedings constitutes an alternative basis for affirmance
of the trial court's decision.

Standard of review:

An appellate

court may affirm the trial court on any proper grounds.
Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988).

Buehner

This issue

was preserved in the trial court as reflected by Findings of Fact
55, 56 and 57 and in Sam John Barber's written closing arguments.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant accepts Plaintiff's statement of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
History of Marriage.

The parties were married on September
3

10, 1977.

(Finding of Fact No. 1). They had been married less

than 15 years when the plaintiff filed this divorce action on
August 5, 1992.

(R. at 1, 28)1.

Two children were born during the

marriage, Angela, age 18, at the time of trial, who graduated from
high school three months after trial, and Adrian, born May 29,
1981.

(T. at 22-23) .

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties,

Plaintiff was awarded custody of the parties' children.

At the

time of trial, plaintiff was 44 and defendant was 45 years of age.
(T. at 22, 80). Defendant was in an airplane crash in August of
1995 and lost his right eye.

(T. at. 165). A significant portion

of the Defendant's work responsibilities involves reading and
analyzing reports.

(T. at 166). Although the defendant had been

able to perform those functions 9 to 10 hours a day prior to the
accident, the strain on his eye has now limited his ability perform
those tasks for a daily maximum of three to four hours.

(T. at

166; Finding of Fact No. 60).

Expenses and income of Mrs, Barber-

until 1992, the year of

the parties' separation, the parties had relied primarily on Mr.
Barber's income.

(T. at 27).

Mr. Barber's annual income had

ranged between $30,000 in 1981 to $60,000 in 1991 while the parties
were together, not including any benefits provided by his company.
(T. at 1071, Ex. 52). Mr. Barber paid approximately 34 percent of
Plaintiff has denominated all record citations denoted by
"R" as citations to the transcript rather than the record. In an
attempt to minimize confusion, Defendant has listed all citations
containing the transcript with a "T" to remain consistent with
the Plaintiff's use of the transcript. All citations containing
an "R" in this brief are citations to the record on appeal and
contain primarily pleadings, notices and minute entries.
4

his gross income in taxes, which would have left the entire family
with approximately $3,333 per month in 1991.
of Fact No. 50).

(T. at 1051; Finding

In 1992, Mr. Barber's entire after-tax income

would have only been approximately $3,500.

(T at 1158).

Plaintiff claimed at trial that her monthly expenses were
$5,481.00
the

(T. at 45-52; Exhibit 2 ) . Sam Barber carefully analyzed

Plaintiff's

expenses

and

pointed

out

substantially over-inflated and inaccurate.

where

they

(T. at 1071).

were
He

indicated specifically where Mrs. Barber had made errors in her
calculations

for

a

housekeeper,

utilities,

food,

clothing,

children's allowances, entertainment, Angela's tuition and other
items which reduced Mrs. Barber's necessary monthly expenses for
her and Adrian to $3,345 per month.

(T. at 1071-79; Ex. 52). The

trial court determined that $3,345 was the true amount of Mrs.
Barber's monthly expenses.

(T. 1071-79; Ex. 52; Finding of Fact

No.51).
At the time of trial, plaintiff was employed at Dillards
Department Store earning $8.00 per hour, thirty-five hours a week,
or approximately $1,213.00 per month.
Expenses and Income of Mr. Barber.

(R. at 405).
Sam Barber testified that

his reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses were $3,680
per month.

(T. at 1079-83; Exhibit.79).

The lower court found Mr.

Barber's income fell in a range between $3,200 and $3,680 per
month.
79

(Finding of Fact No. 47). A comparison of Exhibits 52 and

reveals

that Mr. Barber's expenses were greater than Mrs.

Barber's expenses primarily as a result of Mr. Barber's need to
5

incur significantly greater debt to pay for the costs associated
with furnishing an apartment and pay for his business valuations
and attorneys fees.

Mr. Barber's expenses set forth at trial do

not even include the debt that Mr. Barber was ordered to incur to
pay Mrs. Barber

the

$64,159

initial down payment

Barber's share of the parties' business interests.

toward Mrs.

(See Finding of

Fact No. 43). The amount of this debt obviously was unknown until
the lower court issued its decision.

Mrs. Barber, in contrast, was

awarded this initial lump sum of $64,159 toward the business buyout
in addition to her monthly payments. (Finding of Fact No. 4 3 ) .
Mark Papanikolas, the C.P.A. for the Barber Bros, entities,
was requested by the Court during the trial to determine Mr.
Barber's income including base salary, bonuses, the value of any
perks that Mr. Barber had received, and all contributions made by
the businesses based on Mr. Barber's ownership.

(T. at 1016-17).

Mr. Papanikolas testified that Sam Barber's base salary at the
time of trial was $78,000

(T. at 98, 1038) but that he also

received an annual bonus that had averaged approximately $8,000 per
year.

(T at 1038).

Mr. Papanikolas also attributed the value of

all benefits Sam Barber received through the Barber Bros, entities,
regardless of whether Mr. Barber could actually convert the benefit
to cash.

(T. at 1038-42).

These benefits included the value of

personal auto use for Mr. Barber and his daughter Angela, his
personal use of credit cards and a cabin owned by the company, the
health club dues paid by the business for him, and the family
portion of any business trips paid by either the Barber Bros.
6

businesses or the manufacturer.

(T. at 1038-42).

The total value

of Mr. Barber's salary, bonuses, benefits and perks, not including
any

attribution

of

the businesses1

charitable contributions,

amounted to $96,300 per year, or $8,025 per month.

(T. at 1038-42;

Exhibit 51; Finding of Fact No.7).
Business Interests. Sam Barber is employed through a group of
automobile dealerships and related entities that he owns with his
three brothers, Charles, Fred and John.

The businesses and Sam

Barber's respective interests are as follows:

Company
Barber
Barber
Barber
Barber

Sam Barber's »
Bros.
Bros.
Bros.
Bros.

Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc.
Imports, Inc.
Motor Company, Inc.
Automotive Services, Inc.

Barber Bros. Limited Partnership

Type

51.50%
44.00%
3 9.03%
25.00%

"S" Corp.
"S" Corp.
"C" Corp.
"S" Corp.

25.00%

Lim. Part.

The future of the Pontiac-Olds dealership is very much in
doubt.

(T. at 1125-28).

Sam Barber testified that General Motors

was terminating the dealership's right to sell one of its two
existing

automobile

lines,

Oldsmobile,

consolidation plan known as Project 2000.

as

part

of

GM's

(T. at 1209).

He

further testified that it was very uncertain whether the dealership
would be able to keep the Pontiac line.

(T. at 1127) .

He read

from the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement with GM which clearly
indicated that GM was not required to pay the dealership anything
for goodwill upon GM's withdrawal of an automotive line.
1210-1212; Exhibit 86) .
fluctuations in earnings.
The

Imports

(T. at

The Pontiac-Olds entity has had wide
(T. at 850).

dealership

is severely
7

undercapitalized

and

sustained total losses of nearly of $350,000 in 1990 and 1991.
(Exhibit 34 at its Exhibit 11). Its sales have fluctuated widely
since that time.

Id.

The Motor Company has recently been required by General Motors
to build a large new building to keep the GM lines separate in all
respects (i.e. sales, service and parts) from the Chrysler lines
sold by the Dealership.

(T. at 936-37).

As a result of the new

building, costs at the dealership had increased by an amount in
excess of $100,000 per month at the Motor Company during the four
months prior to trial.

(T. at 1113).

Automotive Services is a captive company that depends on the
three dealerships for its existence.

(T. at 952) . It provides the

in-house warranties and finance and insurance services for the
dealerships.

(T. at 146) . Because the company has no way to gauge

the quality of components made by the manufacturers of the products
it warrants, substantial uncertainty exists in knowing whether the
amounts charged to customers to cover the warranties or finance and
insurance charge backs were adequate.

(T. at 953).

There is substantial interplay and interchange between the
above

companies.

(T. at

151).

The

Barber

Bros.

Limited

Partnership is not an income producing entity and merely owns the
building and land upon which the Imports dealership is located

(T.

at 948) .
Each of the four Barber brothers has a specific area of
responsibility and are paid from earnings of a different company.
(T. at 186). Sam Barber manages Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile,
8

Fred Barber manages Barber Bros. Motor Company, Charles Barber
oversees Barber Bros. Imports and each draws their salary from the
company they oversee.
all

John Barber oversees used car operations in

three dealerships

and

is paid by Barber Bros.

Automotive

Services, since that entity is a captive company providing warranty
services to only the three dealerships.

(T. at 154-155).

The four brothers meet in director meetings once per month and
discuss
Although

the
the

operations
brothers

in

the

each

four businesses.
have

their

(T. at 196).

assigned

areas

of

responsibility, they will assist and help each other as needed.
(T. at 185-186) . For example, when the Imports Co. was struggling
and sustaining substantial losses in the early 1990's, Sam Barber
would work at the dealership to assist in its operation. (T. at
185-86) .
The four Brothers have set their salaries on an approximately
equal basis.

(T. at 168-74).

There are slight differences in

their salaries based on small bonuses (up to $1,000 per month) for
achieving performance objectives, but the Brothers have gone to
great lengths to equalize their base incomes.

(T. at 169, 1038).

For example, because Fred Barber and Charles Barber each pay for
one of their parent's automobiles, they are paid more to account
for it.

(T. at 173).

Similarly, when Fred Barber has paid the

charitable contributions attributable to the Motor Company, he is
compensated for that amount to keep the salaries equal.

(T. at

172-73) .
The brothers have had a close working relationship that has
9

allowed them to remain in business for nearly 15 years.
174).

(T. at

When making decisions, they attempt to build consensus among

themselves and have never been required to actually vote their
percentage ownership in their respective companies.

(T. at 193).

The business relationship between the brothers has worked well
because each brother has been reluctant to take a hard stand on
issues but defers to what the majority has wanted.

(T. at 198-

200) .
Because of this high degree of respect, Sam Barber does not
have the ability to control his brothers and do whatever he wants,
even

though

he

dealership.

owns

a majority

interest

(T. at 99-100; 960-961).

in

the

Pontiac-Olds

He cannot fix his salary

without consideration of his brothers feelings and obtaining their
approval.
testified

(T. at 98-99).
at

trial

that

Both Sam Barber and Mark Papanikolas
Sam

overruled by his brothers.

Barber's

desires

(T. at 187, 960-962).

are

frequently

If he were to

unilaterally raise his salary, the other brothers would want an
equal amount.

(T. at 976).

Such an action would cause great

disruption and disharmony and threaten the very existence of the
businesses.

(T. at 174-76).

The four brothers have a business philosophy based on their
religious

beliefs

that

the

businesses

should

pay

charitable

contributions of approximately ten percent of the net profits of
each business.

(T. at 161-65).

by all four brothers.

The contributions are determined

(T. at 120, 146) . The businesses contribute

to a variety of different organizations in the community.
10

(T. at

163).

For example, in 1994, (by far the most profitable year) the

Pontiac-Olds

dealership

made

charitable

donations

different charities and community organizations.
Exhibit 65) .

to

forty

(T. at 1105;

One result of the contributions has been a very

substantial number of car sales to people in the organizations to
whom contributions have been made.

Sam Barber testified that the

dealerships sell a greater number of cars through their charitable
contributions than through advertising.

(T. at 165).

Each of the four business valuators in this matter recognized
that the charitable contributions were made by the businesses,
rather

than

the

individual

brothers,

and

added

contributions to the profits of each of the businesses.

back

the

(Yeanoplos

- Exhibit 12 at 17; Dorton - Exhibit 28 at 12; Schmidt - Exhibit 13
at

3;

Papanikolas

- Exhibit

16

at

5).

The

valuators

then

multiplied the adjusted higher amount of profits by a multiplier of
anywhere from 1.25 to 4.7 to establish the value of the business.
Id.

If the charitable contributions had been considered salary to

the brothers, then the funds would not have been assumed to remain
in the business

and value

of

the businesses

would

considerably reduced under each of the valuations.
All

of

the

undercapitalized.

Barber

Bros.

(T. at 1090-1094).

entities

have

been

(T. at 1218).
are

severely

The various

automobile

manufacturers have specific working capital requirements which
specify the minimum amount of working capital each dealership must
maintain.

Id-

The dealers are required to report the amount of

capital in monthly reports to the manufacturer.
11

Id.

If a dealer

fails to maintain sufficient working capital, the manufacturer may
terminate the franchise agreement with the dealership, depriving
the dealership of cars to sell.
General

Motors

(T. at 1092).

required

the

Pontiac-Olds

dealership

to

maintain working capital of $596,000 but the dealership carried
only $410,000 in working capital.

(T. at 1091; Exhibit 53). The

Motor Company's working capital requirement was $675,000 but it
maintained only $520,000.

(T. at 1093; Exhibit 54). The Imports

dealership carried only about one-half of the required $500,000 in
working capital.

(T. at 1094).

If the Barber Bros, were to

suddenly begin removing additional

funds from the businesses

through increased salaries, there is a substantial risk that the
automobile manufacturers would terminate the franchise.

(T. at

1092; Finding of Fact No. 17).
The automobile industry is extremely cyclical and the Barber
Bros, entities are no exception. (T. at 916; 1123).

These cycles

can clearly be seen through an examination of the dealer's profits
in the three dealerships as set forth in their respective tax
returns as summarized by Mark Papanikolas in Exhibit 16.
Dealer
Pontiac-Olds
Motor Company
Imports

1991
<152,500>
< 82,700>

(Exhibit at 5, 9, 13) .

1992
<48,800>
<17,400>
6,000

1993

1994

1995

76,900
50,400
<600>

359,700
237,100
139,800

261,100
360,000
23,900

Sam Barber testified in his twenty-six

years in the car business, he has seen many cycles and the outlook
for the industry was very cyclical.

(T. at 1123-1124) . He further

testified that the top of the business cycle likely occurred in
12

1994.

Id.

He specifically indicated that there was currently a

downward trend in profitability.

Id.

Kent Schmidt testified that

the 1994 sales year was an unusually large aberration because it
was an exceedingly high year.
Business Evaluations.

(T. at 313).

The Court heard testimony from four

business valuators at trial.

Kent Schmidt and Mark Papanikolas

valued the businesses on behalf of Mr. Barber. Kevin Yeanoplos and
David Dorton valued the businesses on behalf of Mrs. Barber.
Kent Schmidt.
National

Kent Schmidt formed a business known as

Business Brokers

different types of business.

in 1977 which
(T. at 285).

sells a variety of

His business has valued

and sold over 1,600 businesses since its inception.

(T. at 287).

Mr. Schmidt has personally specialized the sale of Automobile
dealerships and franchises and has valued approximately 3 00 to 400
automobile dealerships/franchises since 1984.

(T. at 287-88). He

had valued 3 0 to 4 0 automobile dealerships/franchises in the year
prior to trial, 11 of which had been sold.

(T. at 288) .

Mr.

Schmidt valued the business based upon the universal standard of
value as follows:

"cash or cash equivalent price for which

property would change hands between a willing buyer and willing
seller, both being adequately informed of all relevant facts and
neither being compelled to buy or sell."

(T. at 3 02).

Mr. Schmidt utilized the method to value the Barber car
dealerships that is normally used between buyers and sellers in the
car industry nationwide.

(T. at 354-55).

The method involved

establishing the true market value of the equity of the businesses
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through making appropriate adjustments to book value and

then

adding to that equity a factor for goodwill by taking a multiplier
of

adjusted

earnings.

(Exhibits

13,

14, 15) .

Although

he

acknowledged that the method was sometimes referred to as a "rule
of thumb" method, he clarified that phrase is actually a misnomer
because the method requires taking all relevant facts into account
through adjustments and through setting an appropriate multiplier.
(T. at 352-53) .
Mr. Schmidt also applied a discount of 2 0 percent for a lack
of marketability of Mr. Barber's interest in the businesses he
evaluated.
discount

was

(T. at 321).
required

He explained that a lack marketability

by

investors

inability to sell their interest.

or buyers

based

on

their

(T. at 322). He indicated that

such discounts typically ranged between 20 and 70 percent and he
desired to be conservative and accept the lower value.

(T. at

322) .
He further took and a discount of 30 percent for Mr. Barber's
minority

interest

dealership.
discount

in all entities other than the

(T. at 331-33) .

was the accepted

Pontiac-Olds

He explained that a 30 percent

discount

in this type of

situation

although the interest in fact may not be able to be sold to anyone.
(T. at 332). He also explained that the discount was taken because
a minority shareholder cannot control the entity and therefore a
minority interest is less desirable.

(T. at 333-34; 378-79).

Mr. Schmidt determined his multiplier of earnings based upon
the desirability of the automotive lines carried (T. at 308), the
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expected sales in a given market (T. at 3 07) , and the history of
the income stream

(T. at 308) .

Based on the differences in the

dealerships, he used a multiplier of two for the Motor Company and
1.25 for the Pontiac-Olds and Imports dealerships.

(T. at 308.

Mr. Schmidt specifically considered the report of GM's Project 2000
in his analysis.

(T. at 353).

Mr. Schmidt also made a large number of technical adjustments
that revealed his experience in selling dealerships and knowledge
of each of the dealerships.

(T. at 313-20; 327-31; 337-42).

He

made an adjustment to inventory in the Pontiac-Olds store and also
took into consideration the tax impact of the adjustment.
315) .

(T. at

He added back depreciation only after he did a complete

walk-through of the businesses and viewed every piece of equipment.
(T. at 317; 371-72).

He took an average of earnings to minimize

the aberration cause by the extremely large sales in 1994.
313) .

(T. at

He also added the charitable contributions made by the

businesses back into the profits of the business, presuming they
had stayed there.

(T. at 309).

Mark Papanikolas.

Mark Papanikolas also valued the Barber

Bros, businesses at the request of Sam Barber.

Mr. Papanikolas had

been the C.P.A. for the various Barber businesses since their
inception.

(T. at 880) . Mr. Papanikolas had experience in valuing

five businesses other than the Barber Bros, entities, one of which
was a car dealership of significantly larger size.
He

also

had

performed

accounting

work

for

(T. at 880).

seven

different

automobile dealerships other than Barber Bros, and had two other
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automobile dealers as current clients.

(T. at 884).

Mr. Papanikolas relied on IRS ruling 59-60 which sets forth
eight factors to be considered in valuing a business.

(T. at 883) .

He described how each of the eight factors related to the Barber
Bros, businesses.
59-60

He pointed out that Sec. 4.02 (d) of IRS ruling

specifically

statements

should

required
be

that

required

"detailed

for

a

profit

and

representative

loss
period

immediately prior to the required date of appraisal, preferably
five or more years.

(T. at 887; Exhibit 41 at 240).

He further

pointed out that the Capitalization of Excess Earnings - Treasury
Method

utilized by Kevin Yeanoplos

entities

was

described

in

IRS

Rule

to value

the Barber

68-609.

That

Bros,

rule

also

specifically required that a five year average of earnings should
be utilized and abnormal years should be eliminated.

(T. at 888;

Exhibit 42 at 1334).
Mr. Papanikolas indicated that he had been involved in the
actual

purchase

or

sale

of

five

automobile

dealerships

or

franchises through his clients and that the same method was always
applied to compute the value the businesses.

(T. at 891-92) .

The method requires a determination of the present market
value of the business equity through making adjustments to book
value and then adding a factor for goodwill based on the adjusted
earnings of the company.

(T. at 892) .

He testified that this

methodology had been actually utilized by the Barber Bros, when
they sold a dealership they had owned in 1988 known as High Country
Chevrolet

(T. at 893-96, Exhibit 43), when they purchased the
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Chrysler and Chevrolet franchises

(T. at 896-98), and when they

purchased

franchises

the

Suzuki

and

Subaru

Imports. (T. at 898-900; Exhibits 44, 45).

for

Barber

Bros.

He further indicated

that one of his clients not related to the Barber Bros, entities
was in the process of purchasing a dealership larger than the
Barber Bros, entities and the exact same methodology was utilized.
(T. at 901) .
In

applying

the methodology

in valuing

the Barber

Bros,

entities, Mr. Papanikolas made a number of adjustments to the
current balance sheet of the businesses to arrive at their true
fair market value of their equity and also adjusted five years of
income statements to reflect the true earnings of entities.
919-955; Exhibit 16).

(T at

He specifically added back all charitable

contributions in excess of 5 percent of net income into the profits
of the business.

(T. at 928) .

He used a straight average of 5

years income statements as required by IRS ruling 59-60

(T. at

929) , except he did not include the loss year of 1991 in the
Imports business because he considered it an aberration associated
with the start-up costs.

(T. at 941-42).

Mr. Papanikolas applied

a lack of marketability discount of 20 percent for Mr. Barber's
interest in the entities except the Imports Company, which had a
negative value.
minority

(T. at 938); Exhibit 16). He took a 25 percent

discount

in

all

entities

except

the

Pontiac-Olds

dealership and the Imports Company. (Exhibit 16).
Mr.

Papanikolas

explained

in detail why he took

marketability and minority discounts in this case.
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lack of

(T. at 901-

909) .

He also referred to a treatise edited by Shannon Pratt

entitled

Valuing

Small

Businesses

Practices wherein a survey was done of

and

Professional

117 accredited

senior

business appraisers of the American Institute of Appraisers. The
survey found that where a business interest being appraised for
divorce purposes represented

a minority

interest

in a company

controlled by the spouse's family, 37 percent of the appraisers
would always apply a discount, 37 percent sometimes applied a
discount and only 26 percent never applied a discount.
05).

(T. at 904-

The survey also found that in the same situation, 52 percent

would always apply a marketability discount, 34 percent

would

sometimes apply that discount and a small 14 percent would never
apply such a discount.

(T. at 905-06).

He also referred to

the Estate Planning and Taxation Coordinator, another treatise
relied upon by accountants and business valuators, which revealed
that an SEC study regarding of hundreds of stock sales concluded
that restricted stocks sold on average 24 percent less than the
prices for similar blocks of unrestricted stock.
The

treatise

also

analyzed

27

tax

court

separately stated marketability discounts.

(T. at 907-08) .

cases

that

allpwed

These discounts ranged

anywhere

from 10 to 36 percent, with an average marketability

discount

of

22 percent.

(T. at

907-08) .

The treatise

also

analyzed 17 Court cases that allowed minority discounts with an
average discount of approximately 25 percent.

(T. at 909).

Mr.

Papanikolas testified that it was his experience that minority and
lack of marketability discounts were typically taken when a portion
18

of a company is sold.

(T. at 909) .

Finally, Mr, Papanikolas referred to the National Automobile

Management Guide tQ Valuing an Automobile Dealership published by
the National Automobile Dealers Association in June of 1995, which
had been initially introduced by Plaintiff's counsel on crossexamination

as

an

authoritative

automobile industry,

source

on valuation

(T. at 1010; Exhibit 78) .

in the

This treatise

indicated that minority discounts depended upon voting control but
averaged, 35 percent.

It further stated that non-marketability

discounts for closely held securities ranged from 7 to 95 percent
with an average of 4 0 percent.

(T. at 1052-53; Exhibit 78).

Mr. Papanikolas valued Sam Barber's interest in the various
Barber Bros, entities at $473,700.

(T. at 917, Exhibit 16). He

acknowledged in his testimony that after speaking to Kent Schmidt
regarding the depreciation adjustment and carefully considering the
tax consequences of front loading the taxes on warranty reserves,
he would have changed his valuation of Sam Barber's total interest
to approximately $560,000.

(T. at 918; 954).

Although Mr. Papanikolas did not consider the impact of tax
consequences for purposes of his valuation, he did calculate the
net effect of capital gains taxes on the parties in the event the
Court ordered Sam Barber's business interests sold.
914;

Exhibit

46).

(T. at 910-

Mr. Papanikolas also testified

that the

automobile industry was very cyclical and was likely at the top of
the business cycle during the years of 1993-1995.
Kevin Yeanoplos.

(T. at 917).

Kevin Yeanoplos had very little experience
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in conducting

business valuations.

(T. at

973) .

Until

his

departure from his accounting firm at Green, Black and Yeanoplos
three months prior to trial in October of 1995, Mr. Yeanoplos had
valued only a total of 10 to 15 businesses himself.
He had never valued a car dealership.
involvement

in

valuations

had

(T. at 473).

(T. at 634) .

been

limited

His other

to

telephone

conversations ranging from 5 minutes to an hour and a half.
4 69-72) .

(T. at

Although he claimed to be a member of the National

Association

of

Certified

Valuation

Analysts,

this

was

an

organization created by his former accounting firm which he had
joined while working at the firm.

(T. at 474). He admitted that

he had no experience in the automobile industry and relied on
others for information regarding the industry.

(T. at 513).

He

had no idea whether 1994 was the best year ever in the automotive
industry or whether it was even the best year in the last 10 years.
(T. at 4 94).

He then acknowledged that 1994 was the best year in

the last 5 years and that the industry profits had dropped off in
1995

(T. at 494-95) but also admitted he did not even look at

industry averages during the last 5 years.
Mr.

Yeanoplos

claimed

conducting his valuation

to

rely

on

(T. at 494).
IRS

Ruling

59-60

in

(T. at 275) and stated that the "fair

market value" of a business is the price at which property would
change

hands

between

a

willing

buyer

and

presuming neither are under any compulsion.

a

willing

seller,

(T. at 476) . However,

he established the value of Sam Barber's interest in the businesses
only as to what it should be worth to Sam Barber, based on Mr.
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Barber's continuation in the business and based on his continuing
use of his skills, experience and training in the business.

(T. at

477-83) . Mr. Yeanoplos did not utilize minority discounts because
he believed that Sam Barber had control of all the businesses.

(T

at 462) .
Mr. Yeanoplos utilized two methodologies

in valuing the

businesses: the capitalization of earnings method which yielded a
value of Mr. Barber's business interests of $1,276,000 and the
capitalization of excess earnings - treasury method which valued
Mr. Barber's interest at $1,967,000.

(Exhibit 12).

Mr. Yeanoplos

admitted that the capitalization of earnings method relies on a
capitalization rate that is totally subjective to the valuator.
(T. at 506) .

Mr. Yeanoplos acknowledged that the Barber Bros,

businesses are under-capitalized, highly leveraged and present a
higher degree of risk.
Mr. Yeanoplos
the

(T. at 487-88).

Despite this admission,

utilized a capitalization rate of 21.30% for all of

businesses,

in essence

multiplying

the earnings

businesses by 4.695 to determine their value.

of the

(T. at 514). Mr.

Yeanoplos acknowledged that a mere two percent change in the
capitalization rate would change the total value of the businesses
by nearly 10 percent.

(T at 523) .

Mr. Yeanoplos added back into the earnings stream 100% of the
charitable contributions (T. at 590), which increased the value of
the businesses by 4.695 times the amount of the charitable
contributions.

Mr. Yeanoplos further utilized a weighted average

that placed a greater emphasis on the earnings of the higher sales
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years of 1994 and 1995 in his valuation.
The

second

method

utilized

(T. at 594).

by

Mr.

Yeanoplos,

the

capitalization of excess earnings - treasury method, is based upon
IRS Ruling 68-609.
this

Ruling

(T. at 608). Mr. Yeanoplos acknowledged that

states

that

the

method

should

be

used

to

value

intangibles only if there is no better evidence available
making the determination.

(T. at 608) .

Mr. Yeanoplos

for

again

utilized weighted averages in determining this average income.

(T.

at 610).
The

capitalization

- treasury

method

utilized by Mr. Yeanoplos valued Sam Barberfs interest

in the

companies

at

of

$1,967,000.

excess

(Exhibit

earnings

12).

However,

on cross-

examination, Mr. Yeanoplos acknowledged that if he had used a plain
average rather than a weighted average of income and had altered
four disputed adjustments in the Pontiac Oldsmobile store, the
method would have reduced the value of Mr. Barber's interests by
approximately $900,000.
David Dorton.

(T. at 614-631; Exhibits 21, 22, 23 & 24).

David Dorton actually provided three valuations

of Sam Barber's business interests specifically for use in this
matter.

He valued Mr. Barber's interest at $525,000 in a business

valuation dated May 14, 1993.

(T. at 739; Exhibit 34).

He then

performed a second valuation dated May 25, 1995, which valued Mr.
Barber's interest in the businesses at $662,500.

(T. at 739;

Exhibit 35). His third valuation, dated February 1, 1996, valued
Mr. Barber's business interests at $1,351,300.
28) .
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(T. at 31; Exhibit

Mr. Dorton did not visit any of the Barber Bros, businesses in
making his valuation.

(T. at 738) .

He acknowledged that his

methods of valuation were largely a subjective exercise.
735) .

(T. at

Mr. Dorton also made a clerical error in his valuation by

taking the LIFO adjustment twice for the Pontiac-Olds store during
the years of 1990 through 1993.

(T. at 753-754; 956-958).

error changed his earnings computations by $39,000.
Plaintiff's Intentional Delays.

This

(T. at 754).

The plaintiff intentionally

caused this matter to be delayed in order to take advantage of the
unusually high sales years of 1994 and 1995.
Nos.

55-56).

(Findings of Fact

As noted above, Plaintiff's own business expert,

David Dorton, completed three separate valuations of Mr. Barber's
business

interests.

The

first valuation

(Exhibit

34, p.24),

completed by David Dorton on May 14, 1993 valued Mr. Barber's
business interests at $525,000 as of April 30, 1993.

(T. at 734).

This valuation was completed prior to the time this matter was pretried

on

May

5,

1994.

After

this

valuation

was

completed,

Plaintiff's attorney, Martin Custen, withdrew in November of 1993.
(T. at 1228).
Mr. Barber's prior counsel, Judy Barking, immediately sent
Plaintiff a notice to appoint counsel or appear in person.

(T. at

1228; Exhibit 75). Despite this notice being sent, Plaintiff did
not obtain counsel.

(T. at 1228).

Ms. Barking then sent another

letter to Plaintiff dated March 15, 1994 (Exhibit 67) and enclosed
a request for a pre-trial hearing.

(T. at 1229) . Mr. Neeley then

entered his appearance as counsel for Plaintiff approximately one
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week before

the pre-trial held in May of 1994.

(R. at 46).

Plaintiff delayed this matter for nearly six months after * the
Notice to Appoint Counsel had been sent before obtaining additional
counsel.
When

Plaintiff

finally

additional delays followed.

did

obtain

counsel,

substantial

Sam Barber testified that at the May

1994 pre-trial hearing, Mr. Neeley indicated that he needed to
update Mr. Dorton's May 1993 valuation because he believed that the
outlook

for

brighter.

the

automobile

(T. at 1132).

industry

was

looking

considerably

This testimony was uncontested.

Ms. Barking then sent Mr. Neeley a letter dated July 21, 1994
requesting

that

he

advise

her

"as

soon

as

possible"

of

the

information that Mr. Dorton would need to update his valuation.
(T. at 1232; Exhibit 68). The letter clearly indicated Ms. Barking
had been attempting to contact Mr. Neeley unsuccessfully.
68) .

(Exhibit

In a letter dated August 2, 1994, Mr. Neeley apologized for

the delay and indicated that he would attempt to get the valuation
completed when Mr. Dorton returned on August 8, 1994. (T. at 1233;
Exhibit 69) .

Between August 31, 1994 and October 19, 1994, Ms.

Barking sent three more letters to Mr. Neeley (Exhibits 70 - 72)
all pleading for Mr. Neeley to specify the information that he
desired to update the valuation.

(T. at 1233-34)

Ms. Barking then requested a scheduling conference to set the
trial date which was held on January 20, 1995.
that time, trial was set for March 6, 1995.

(R. at 82-84) . At
(R. at 87-90).

On

February 17, 1995, Mr. Neeley finally specified that he needed the
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tax returns for 1993 and 1994 (Plaintiff having now delayed the
matter until the end of 1994) and indicated that Mr. Dorton would
need 60 additional days to complete his updated valuation.
1234-123 5; Exhibit 73) .
the trial date

(T. at

Plaintiff accordingly moved to continue

(Exhibit 73) and the Court granted

motion, resetting the trial for May 23, 1995.

Plaintiff's

(R. at 91-92) . This

trial date was over one and a half years since Ms. Barking had sent
the Notice to appoint counsel and over one year since the pre-trial
date.2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court entered 61 specific factual findings spanning
nearly 18 pages that completely supported its orders set forth in
the Decree.

Plaintiff seeks to avoid these numerous factual under-

pinnings by simply ignoring them or arguing against the orders as
if no factual findings had been made.

She has completely failed in

her obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the trial

2

Mr. Barber then obtained his present counsel, in April of
1995. Mr. Dorton did not complete his updated valuation until
after the day of trial, May 23, 1995. (See Exhibit 35 indicating
effective date of April 30, 1995 but completion date of May 25,
1995). Accordingly, the parties stipulated to a two week delay
of trial until June 5, 1995. Mr. Thomas's uncontested proffered
testimony was that a misunderstanding occurred regarding the June
5, 1995 setting wherein only one day was reserved for trial which
he indicated he did not consider long enough to try this matter.
Accordingly, this case was set for August 28, 29 and 30, 1995.
Shortly before this trial date, Sam Barber was seriously injured
in an airplane crash causing the loss of an eye. Trial was then
delayed for five months primarily because of scheduling conflicts
in Mr. Neeley's calendar and was set for January 29, 30, and 31,
1996. Mr. Dorton's updated valuation was again not timely
delivered and the Court delayed trial on the valuation issues for
one week until February 5, 1996. (T. at 1241-1242).
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court's findings and she presents essentially only that evidence
which was favorable to her position.
Substantial evidence existed that supported the trial court's
findings that Sam Barber did not have the ability to take as salary
the charitable contributions paid by the businesses in which he
owns an interest.

Therefore, attributing these contributions to

him as salary for purposes of computing alimony and child support
would operate as an unjust penalty against him.
In addition, Plaintiff has already been paid her share of
these contributions through her award of Mr. Barber's business
interests because all the business appraisers increased the value
of the businesses by adding the contributions to the income stream
of

the

businesses.

If

the

appraisers

had

considered

the

contributions to the part of the owner's salaries, the appraisals
would have been significantly reduced.
The trial court made numerous underlying factual
regarding

the parties'

incomes

and

expenses.

These

findings
findings

clearly show that Plaintiff has significantly greater disposable
income than Mr. Barber.

Plaintiff has more than enough income to

meet her reasonable expenses, whereas Mr. Barber has a substantial
shortfall.

Indeed, Mr. Barber would still have a significant

shortfall even if he could remove a portion of the charitable
contributions of the businesses as part of his salary.
Plaintiff has no need for additional funds, and Mr. Barber
lacks the ability to pay any additional funds to her.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff should not be awarded any additional alimony or attorneys
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fees.

The trial court valued Mr. Barber's business interests

within the range of values submitted through expert testimony. The
lower court appropriately weighed the testimony and made decisions
regarding the credibility of the experts.

The evidence clearly

indicated that minority and lack of marketability interests were
appropriately applied in determining the value of Mr. Barber's
business interests. Moreover, the trial court was not required to
average the valuations in the manner suggested by Plaintiff on
appeal.
Finally,

the

trial

court's

finding

that

Plaintiff

intentionally delayed these proceedings for one and one-half years
provides an alternative basis for affirmance of the lower court's
order.

The delays have already inured to the Plaintiff's benefit

and she should not be allowed any additional windfalls through her
inappropriate conduct.
ARGUMENT
I
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF CONTESTED
FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WARRANTS
AFFIRMANCE OF THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDINGS.
The appropriate standard of review on appeal is critical to
the

determination

of

this matter.

The

Plaintiff

seeks

to

implicitly or explicitly attack numerous of the lower court's
specific Findings of Fact regarding the issues in this case.

The

Utah Supreme Court has clearly enunciated the standard of review
applicable to an appeal of the trial court's findings of fact in
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Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

There, the court

stated:
To successfully attack findings of fact, an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence
supporting the findings and then demonstrate
that, even if viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the findings.
And the legal sufficiency of the evidence is
determined under civil procedure rule 52 (a),
which provides:
"Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses."
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
A
trial court's factual finding is deemed
"clearly erroneous" only if it is against the
clear weight of the evidence.
Id. at 1179

(citations omitted); See Coalville v. Lundgren. 930

P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State in Interest of W.S..
939 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

This Court has also held

that the same standard applies in divorce cases and stated as
follows:
When challenging a trial courtfs findings of
fact, the party must "marshal all the evidence
supporting the trial courtfs findings and then
show
the
evidence
to
be
legally
insufficient to support the findings." If the
party challenging the finding fails to marshal
the supporting evidence, the trial court's
finding will not be disturbed on appeal.
Breinholt

v.

Breinholt.

905

P.2d

877,

882

(Utah

App.

1995)

(citations omitted).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has not complied with this
rule.

Plaintiff makes no attempt to marshal

the evidence

in

support of the trial court!s finding nor does Plaintiff demonstrate
that the evidence supporting the finding is insufficient even if
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viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court.

Appellant's

brief presents the evidence in a light most favorable to her
position and largely ignores the contrary evidence.

Accordingly,

the lower court's findings should not be disturbed.
II
THE
TRIAL
COURT
APPROPRIATELY
ATTRIBUTED
THE
CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS PAID BY THE BARBER
BROS. BUSINESSES AS THE INCOME OF
THOSE ENTITIES.
A.

Sam Barber does not control the Barber Bros, entities and

flQes HQ£ have tJlfi ability to take the business's charitable
contributions as salary,

The Court in Finding of Fact No. 36

found in relevant part as follows:
First, the credible testimony at trial clearly
indicated that Mr. Barber does not exercise
control over his brothers and does not
exercise day-to-day responsibility over the
businesses
other
than the
Pontiac-Olds
dealership. Even in the Pontiac-Olds store,
Mr. Barber is not free to simply do whatever
he wishes without ruining the working
relationship he has with his brothers.
Similarly Findings of Fact Nos. 58 and 59 provide as follows.
The Court finds that the four Barber brothers
all take approximately equal salaries. There
are slight differences based on bonuses and
meeting their objectives.
Fred Barber's
salary is higher because he pays for his
parents' car and also receives a good business
bonus.
The Court finds that in setting the salaries
in each of the Barber Bros, entities, the four
Barber brothers have a high degree of trust
and respect for each other and are not
inclined to do anything that would be unfair
or heavy handed. The business relationship
between the brothers has worked well because
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each brother has been reluctant to take a hard
stand on issues but defers to what the
majority wanted. Because of this high degree
of respect, the Court finds that Mr. Barber
cannot do whatever he wants, even though he
owns a majority interest in the Pontiac-Olds
dealership.
The Court finds that he cannot
fix his salary without consideration of his
brother's
feelings
and
obtaining
their
approval. For Mr. Barber to take out the high
salary would cause great disharmony and
disruption of the businesses.
All of the above findings were amply supported in the record.
Because

Plaintiff

has neither contested

the validity of

these

findings nor asserted that these findings were not supported by the
evidence, she evidently acknowledges that these findings are true
and correct.
Based on these findings, it would be unjust and unfair for the
trial court to attribute the contributions made by the businesses
to Mr. Barber.

If Mr. Barber cannot elect to take his portion of

the contributions as salary, attributing them to his income would
operate as a penalty over which he has no control.
The charitable contributions made by the all of the brothers
are

a part

of

their business philosophy

(T. at

977-978)

and

significant sales and profits inure to the businesses as a result
of the contributions.

(T. at 155).

It is noteworthy that the

contributions are spread over a wide number of charitable and
community

organizations

significant
reputation

exposure
in

the

to

(T. at
the

1105)

which

businesses

community.

The

undoubtedly

and

brothers

enhances
also

30

their

make

contributions based upon deeply held religious beliefs.
162) .

bring

the

(T. at

No evidence was presented that Mr. Barber's brothers would
make

any

changes

to their business philosophy.

Nor was

any

evidence presented that indicated that Mr. Barber could simply
elect to have the businesses cease the contributions to allow him
to take

the higher

salary.

Plaintiff

failed

to present

any

credible evidence that indicated Mr. Barber's brothers would allow
him to take a portion of the charitable contributions made by the
businesses as an increased salary.

The trial court correctly

determined that the charitable contributions should be attributed
to the businesses based on Mr. Barber's inability to control the
contributions as his own salary.
B.

The

trial

CPUrt

correctly

found

that

the

charitable

contributions paid by the Barber Bros, businesses were added back
into the value of the businesses and that allocating them as income
to Sam Barber would constitute a "double charge". In Finding of Fact
No. 9, the trial court found as follows:
The Court finds that the value of the
charitable contributions paid by the entities
in which Mr. Barber owns a business interest
should not be attributable to Mr. Barber's
personal income. The contributions were added
back into the income stream of the businesses
by each of the business appraisers and then
multiplied by a factor of 1.25 to 4.5,
depending on the valuation, to establish the
value of the businesses.
Mrs. Barber is
receiving one-half of the value of Mr.
Barber's business interests.
It would be
inequitable and a "double charge" to add the
charitable contributions both to the value of
the businesses for valuation purposes and to
Mr. Barber's personal income for purposes of
computing alimony and child support.
This finding was supported by all the evidence at trial.
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All of

the appraisers (including plaintiff's) made an adjustment to the
income statements of the businesses by adding back the amount of
charitable contributions to net income.
17;

Dorton

- Exhibit

28

at

(Yeanoplos - Exhibit 12 at

12; Schmidt

- Exhibit

13

at

3;

Papanikolas - Exhibit 16 at 5) . This adjustment in essence treated
the contributions as if they had never been paid and the funds had
been

left

in

multiplied,

the

businesses.

as part

of

The

the net

contributions

income

of

were

then

the businesses, by

multipliers that ranged anywhere from 1.25 to 4.695 and added to
the value of the businesses.
If the charitable contributions had been treated as the salary
of the brothers, then the contributions, as part of salary expense,
would have been deducted as a normal business expense and would not
be

included

apparently

in
all

the

companies1

believed

that

net

income.

The

Mr.

Barber's

share

contributions were not part of his salary.

appraisers
of

the

Otherwise, they would

have simply added the contributions to Mr. Barber's salary and then
subtracted the higher salary from business revenues to determine
business

income.

There would have been no reason to add the

contributions to the businesses1 net income.
Plaintiff

requested

and

received

half

the

value

of

Mr.

Barber's share of the businesses based on this assumption by all of
the appraisers that the contributions did not constitute salary.
Plaintiff

then

reversed

her

position

and

requested

that

the

contributions be viewed as the salary of Mr. Barber for purposes of
alimony and child support.

Clearly, to value the businesses based
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upon the businesses' retention of the contributions and to also
require the payment of the contributions by the businesses to Mr.
Barber as salary for alimony and child support purposes amounts to
a "double charge" to Mr. Barber. The trial court was correct in so
finding.
Plaintiff's appraisers attempted an interesting manipulation
of salaries in a transparent effort to overcome the problem of
double counting.

Kevin Yeanoplos adjusted Sam Barber's salary

upward by $214,780 over a five year period which admittedly would
have decreased the value of the Pontiac-Olds dealership. However,
he then decreased the salaries of Chuck Barber by $214,790 and Fred
Barber by $31,310 during the same period which significantly
increased the value of the Imports dealership and the Motor
Company.

(Exhibit 12 at 16-17).

The adjustments essentially

canceled each other with respect to value, leaving Mr. Yeanoplos's
adjustment

for

charitable

contributions

intact.

Plaintiff's

assertion that Kevin Yeanoplos increased the compensation for each
of the three Barber brothers (Appellant's Brief at 31) is one of
several plain misrepresentations made by Plaintiff to this Court.
Similarly, David Dorton decreased the income of the PontiacOlds dealership by $18.7 thousand dollars by adjusting average
owners compensation upward by that amount.

However, he basically

offset that adjustment by decreasing the average owner compensation
in the Motor Company by $14.5 thousand dollars and the average
owner compensation in the Imports dealership by $11.7 thousand
dollars which increased the income in those entities. (Exhibit 28
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at its exhibits 1, 6, and 11) .3

Because these adjustments offset

each other, they again did not affect Mr. Dorton f s

charitable

contributions adjustment.
Moreover,

the

Plaintiff's

own

accountant,

Debra

Kelly,

testified that on a national basis, the compensation for automobile
dealers ranges from
Morris Associates.

.003 to

.009 of sales according to Robert

(T. at 798) .

She further admitted on cross-

examination that if Sam Barber had compensation of approximately
$90,000 in 1995, he would be very near to the middle of the range.
(T.

at

834-35).

She

acknowledged

that

if

Sam

Barber

had

compensation of $150,000, which she claimed he should take, his
salary would be approximately .008 of sales (T. at 835), very near
the top of the range of salaries.

Accordingly, there was no reason

for either Mr. Dorton or Mr. Yeanoplos to make their adjustments to
salary.
In light of the lower court's finding that the Barber brothers
business relationship had succeeded based on their equal salaries
(Finding Nos. 58 and 59), the trial court was certainly free to
disregard the offsetting adjustments attempted by Mr Yeanoplos and
Mr. Dorton regarding the brothers1 salaries.

Neither Kent Schmidt

nor Mark Papanikolas adjusted the owners salaries and simply used
the

actual

numbers.

contributions

to net

Therefore,
income

of

3

the

addition

the businesses

of
by

charitable
all

of

the

These numbers were derived by calculating the differences
contained in the adjustments to owner's compensation and the
owners FMV compensation in the 1990-95 average column on the
exhibits.
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appraisers significantly increased the value of the businesses over
what the value would have been if the contributions were considered
as salary to the owners.
The Plaintiff relies on two cases from other jurisdictions, In
re Marriage of Huff. 834 P.2d 244
Trackze. 891 P.2d 1277

(Colo.1992) and Trackze v.

(Okl. 1995), which both held that the

payment of goodwill in a professional practice does not constitute
double dipping against the practitioner's future income.

These

cases have little, if any, factual or legal relevance to the issue
now before the Court.

The cases also appear to be directly

contrary to the position adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) (holding that it was
improper to consider a professional's goodwill or reputation in
valuing a solo dental practice).
In the present case, Mr. Barber does not assert that . the
payment of alimony constitutes a double charge if his business
interests are found to contain goodwill, as was the issue in the
above cases.

He asserts, rather, that the salary expenses which

are deducted from revenue to determine the amount of net income
and, hence, the value of the businesses, should be consistent with
the salary utilized

for alimony and child

support purposes.

Otherwise, Plaintiff receives payment twice on the same funds:
once through the increased value of the business because the funds
are presumed to have remained in the business and twice when the
same funds are presumed not to have been retained by the company
but instead paid out in the form of salary. The above cases simply
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do not address this issue and, therefore, are inapplicable to this
matter.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THE PARTIES' INCOME AND EXPENSES FOR
PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING ALIMONY AND
CHILD SUPPORT.
The trial court set forth in detail the parties1 incomes and
reasonable expenses in Findings of Fact Nos. 46-55.

These findings

were supported by substantial credible evidence at trial as fully
discussed above.
these

Findings

Supra at 4 to 6.
based

on

overt

Plaintiff seeks to overturn
misrepresentations

and

mis-

characterizations regarding Mr. Barber's testimony.
For

example,

Plaintiff

asserts

that

the

Barber

Bros,

businesses contributed $18,000 toward Mr. Barber's attorneys fees.
(Appellant's Brief

at 34).

Yet the very page

in the

record

referred to by Plaintiff clearly reveals that Mr. Barber testified
that he had borrowed the $18,000, that it was carried as an account
receivable, that the loan had to be repaid and that loan was not
income to Mr. Barber.
Mark

Papanikolas

(T. at 191) .
also

testified

that

Sam Barber

had

the

ability to ask his brothers if he could borrow from the Pontiac Olds dealership if the amounts were not excessive.

(T. at 1058) .

However, Mr. Papanikolas emphasized that any such amounts that were
borrowed would need to be repaid.

(T. at 1058) .

Similarly,

Plaintiff's allusions to some inappropriate depreciation expense
(Appellant's Brief at 34) are so vague that they prevent
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any

response.
In short, the Plaintiff has completely failed to show that
Findings of Fact Nos. 46-55 were not supported by credible evidence
presented at trial.
IV
BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS,
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
INCREASE IN HER ALIMONY AWARD EVEN
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE BUSINESSES'
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS WERE ADDED
TO MR. BARBER'S INCOME.
In determining the amount of an award of alimony, a trial
court must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and
needs of the spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce sufficient income for him- or herself; and (3) the ability
of the responding spouse to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d

1072, 1075

(Utah 1985).

The Utah Supreme Court

further

clarified the purpose of alimony in Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144
(Utah 1979), stating:
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital
support; it is intended neither as a penalty
imposed on the husband nor as a reward granted to
the wife. Its function is to provide support for
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent
her from becoming a public charge.
Important criteria in determining a reasonable
award are the financial conditions and needs of the
wife, considering her station in life; her ability
to provide sufficient income for herself; and the
ability of the husband to provide support.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).

Applying the above standards to the

case at bar, the Plaintiff is not entitled to additional alimony
even assuming, arguendo. that Sam Barber could take a portion of
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charitable contributions from the Pontiac-Olds Dealership (which he
adamantly denies he has the ability to do).
The Court in Findings of Fact Nos. 45 through 58 clearly set
forth its findings regarding the amount of the parties' income and
reasonable expenses.

The Court specifically found in Finding No.

53 that Mrs. Barber would have surpluses in excess of $754 per
month through May of 1999 and $567 per month thereafter, even
assuming her expenses did not drop after the parties' child reached
the age of 18 and graduated from high school.

The trial court also

found that Mr. Barber would have a shortfall in his monthly living
expenses of between $1,008 and $1,488 until May of 1999 and between
$687 and $821 thereafter.

This calculation did not include the

repayment of debt Mr. Barber had to incur to pay Mrs. Barber the
lump sum business down payment of
court.

$64,159 ordered by the trial

Even assuming Mr. Barber could borrow these funds at a 7.5

percent interest payable over 20 years, his monthly payment would
be $516.86 per month in addition to his monthly expenses.
The portion of the Pontiac-Olds dealership's contributions
based on Mr. Barber's ownership interest in the company amounts to
$16,600 per year or $1,383.33 per month.

(T. at 1042; Exhibit 51) .

The Pontiac-Olds dealership is the only entity in which Mr. Barber
owns a majority interest.

Even assuming, arguendo. that Mr. Barber

could take his share of charitable contributions from the PontiacOlds

dealership

as

salary

without

destroying

the

business

relationship with his brothers, he still would have insufficient
income to meet his monthly expenses.
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Because Mr. Barber is in a 34

percent tax bracket, his after tax net income would increase by
only $913.00 per month.

Therefore, if Mr. Barber's monthly

expenses were adjusted to account for his payments for the down
payment to plaintiff, he would still not have sufficient income to
cover his reasonable expenses even if he could remove a portion of
contributions from the Pontiac-Olds dealership.
Accordingly, none of the three factors set forth in Jones
above are satisfied in this case: Plaintiff has no need for
additional alimony because she has a significant surplus in her
monthly income;

Mr. Barber does not have sufficient income to

cover his reasonable monthly expenses; and (3) Mr. Barber has no
ability to contribute to Plaintiff's monthly expenses.
V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN VALUING SAM
BARBER'S INTEREST IN THE BARBER
BROS. ENTITIES.
A.

The trial court had broad discretion as the finder of

fact to establish the value of Mr. Barber's business interests. "A
trial court's actions regarding the parties' property interests are
entitled to a presumption of validity' thus, the trial court's
valuation of marital property will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of the discretion.'" Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877,
882 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585,
588 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) and Argyle v. Arayle. 688 P.2d 468, 470
(Utah, 1984)).
The present case was tried over a period of six and a half
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days.

The majority of testimony at trial centered on the value of

Mr. Barber's business interests.

The trial court appropriately

weighed this evidence and entered thirty-one specific findings
based

on

the

evidence

(Findings of Fact 15-45).

and

the

credibility

of

the parties.

Plaintiff has entirely failed to marshal

the evidence that supported the trial court's findings and the
lower court's decision should be affirmed on that basis.

B.

The lower court was free to discard the capitalization of

excess earnings method as applied by Kevin Yeanoplos.

In Findings

of Fact Nos. 23 through 28, the trial court criticized the
credibility of Mr. Yeanoplos and his failure to consider specific
items the court deemed critical to the valuation of Mr. Barber's
interests.

In Finding 31, the court found that the capitalization

of excess earnings as applied to this matter was not credible
because it was so far out of line with the other methods of
valuation utilized by the appraisers. This decision was supported
by substantial credible evidence, including Mr. Yeanoplos own
admission that differences between weighting the income averages
and using actual averages and changes to four disputed adjustments
would drop his valuation under this method by approximately
$900,000.

(T. at 614-631).

Plaintiff apparently asserts that this method must be accepted
as a matter of law simply based on the fact that some other
jurisdictions on occasion have affirmed lower court decisions that
were based on this method.
strengthen

the

presumption

In reality, these cases simply
that
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the

trial

court

has

broad

discretion in establishing value.

c.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting

the testimony of Mark Papanikolas.
witnesses

are within

Credibility determinations of

the sound discretion of

the trial

court

because that court alone can assess the demeanor and relative
credibility of witnesses as part of its fact — finding function.
P'AStOn v, P'AStPfl, 844 P.2d 345, 355 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).

The

trial court in the instant case specifically found Mr. Papanikolas
to be credible, veracious, honest and helpful.

(Finding of Fact

34) .
As

the

accountant

for

the

Barber

Bros,

businesses

with

experience in valuing auto dealerships, the lower court was fully
capable of relying on Mr. Papanikolas.

Although Plaintiff asserts

that Mr. Papanikolas1 credibility was tarnished because his sister
had

loaned

the

Barber

Bros,

a

large

sum

of

money

and

Mr.

Papanikolas had also loaned the entities $25,000, Mr. Papanikolas
fully disclosed these facts to the court within the first ten
minutes of his direct examination.

(T. at 881). Mr. Papanikolas

testified that these transactions did not affect how he performed
his valuations.
The

trial

(T. at 882).
court

clearly had the discretion

to weigh Mr.

Papanikolas1 testimony based upon his expertise and experience and
weigh it against Plaintiff's claims of prejudice.

Accordingly,

the lower court did not clearly abuse its discretion in accepting
the credibility of Mark Papanikolas.
D.

The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in
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applying

minority

and

lack

of marketability

discounts

to

Sam

Barber's business interests because the court's determination of
value fell within the range established by expert testimony.
case

law

clearly

indicates

that

the

trial

court

has

Utah
broad

discretion to establish the value of marital property which will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
facts of Godfrey are instructive.
fifth

interest

in a privately

The

There, the husband owned a oneheld

nursing

home

corporation.

Despite the fact that the wife's expert witness testified that the
plaintiff's interest was worth approximately $65,000, despite the
husband's admission that he valued his interest at about $17,000,
and despite the admission of the husband's financial statements
into evidence which valued his interest at $14,130, the trial court
found his interest to be completely worthless.
In reversing the lower court, the Utah Court of Appeals held
that the lower court was required to value the husband's interest
within the range of values established by the evidence.

id-

lower

property

court

in

essence

had

discretion

anywhere between $14,130 and $65,000.

to value

the

The

If evidence at trial had in

fact indicated that the husband's interest was worthless, the trial
court presumably would have had the discretion to value the stock
at $0. Obviously, if the trial court in Godfrey had the discretion
to discount the expert's valuation of $65,000 by over 78 percent to
$14,130 based on the minority interest in the stock, the lower
court in the present case also had complete discretion to apply
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apply fair and appropriate discounts.
As set forth above, Mark Papanikolas presented

compelling

testimony that this was an appropriate case to apply minority and
lack of marketability discounts.

Supra at 17-19.

Mr. Papanikolas

testified that he relied upon the treatise Valuing Small Businesses
and Professional Practices by Shannon Pratt regarding a survey of
117 senior business appraisers regarding their position on these
discounts when a business is valued for divorce purposes.

That

survey indicated that in a situation where the interest being
appraised represented a minority interest in a company controlled
by the spousefs family, a substantial majority of the appraisers
would

always

or

sometimes

marketability discounts.

take

both

Supra. 17-18.

minority
Mr.

and

lack

of

Papanikolas further

presented evidence of the wide spread use of these discounts in the
automobile

industry

by

reading

excerpts

Automobile Dealers Association publication:

from

the

National

A Dealer Guide to . .

. Valuing an Automobile Dealership (1995) which Plaintiff's counsel
had previously relied on in cross examining Mr. Papanikolas.
treatise states that:
Various
studies
involving
the
nonmarketability discount for minority interests
have indicated a range of discounts from 7 to
95 percent; however there is a consensus among
the
studies
that
discounts
average
approximately 40 percent.
Although these studies took place over a tenyear period, each discovered an average
discount of approximately the same amount.
Thus we can assume that a non-marketability
discount is appropriately applied because of
its historically observed presence as well as
its relative stability.
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This

(Exhibit 78 at 11.)
Most importantly, however, were the specific bases enunciated
by the trial court in Findings of Fact Nos. 35 through 3 9 for
applying these discounts.

Substantial evidence was presented at

trial which supported each of the findings, any one of which would
have

supported

the

court's

decision

to apply the discounts.

Moreover, Sam Barber testified that he simply could not keep
the business interests at the amount at which they were valued by
Plaintiff's experts and they would likely need to be sold and the
proceeds divided.
ample

factual

(T. at 1143).

grounds

to

Accordingly, the trial court had

allow

the

discounts

and

valued

Mr.

Barber's interests within appropriate discretionary bounds.
E.

The trial court was not required to average the adjusted

amounts of the appraisals.

Plaintiff asserts that the trial court

committed a clerical error when the court averaged the amounts of
the appraisals to arrive at the value of Mr. Barber's interests.
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Papanikolas acknowledged that after
hearing all of the evidence at trial, he would revise his valuation
to $560,000.

In reality, all of the appraisers were cross examined

regarding their values and the trial court could have raised or
lowered any of them.

David Dorton acknowledged that he could have

made a clerical error in his valuation because he counted the LIFO
deduction twice.

(T. at 753-754).

Mr. Dorton made this error.

Mark Papanikolas confirmed that

(T. at 957-958).

The trial court was free to elect any method it desired to
establish the value so long as the value fell within the range of
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values established by credible testimony.

It was particularly free

to discard all of the adjustments made by the various appraisers
and to work off the initial numbers they submitted.

Because the

trial court valued Mr. Barber's interests at $728,318, a figure
nearly $170,000 greater than Mr. Papanikolas1 revised valuation
amount, the lower court's decision should not be reversed.
Moreover, the Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue in the lower
court. Except in extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for
the first time on appeal are not considered by appellate courts.

Standard Federal Sav, and Loan Ass'n v, Kirkbrifle/ 821 P.2d 1136,
113 9 (Utah 1991) .
matter

on June

The lower court issued its rulings in this

10 and

June

24, 1996.

(R. at

294; 325).

Defendant's counsel then prepared the proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree and mailed them to Plaintiff's
counsel for his signature.

Plaintiff's counsel objected to the

proposed Findings and Decree(R. at 332-334) yet failed to raise the
claimed clerical error.
on October 31, 1996.

The court then set the matter for hearing
(R. at 341). At the hearing, Plaintiff's

counsel signed the Findings and Decree and they were filed with the
Court.

(R. at 342).

Clearly, the Plaintiff had ample opportunity to raise the
issue in the lower court, but failed to do so.

This issue should

not now be presented for the first time on appeal.
the trial court's valuation should be accepted.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD
45

Accordingly,

VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD
ALIMONY FOR A PERIOD OF TIME EQUAL
TO THE LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE
CONFORMS WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-35(7) (h) (1953 AS AMENDED)
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(7) (h) provides as follows:
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of
time.
This statute took effect May 1, 1995.
The trial court ordered alimony according to the terms of the
above statute and provided that the alimony award would run no
longer than the term of the parties1 marriage.

The Plaintiff

presented no evidence at trial that would have required the trial
court to find extenuating circumstances that justified the payment
of alimony for a longer period of time.

Indeed, in light of the

court's specific Findings of Fact Nos. 56 and 57 that the Plaintiff
intentionally

delayed

this

matter

from

moving

forward,

the

Plaintiff arguably is already receiving a windfall through the
length of the trial court's alimony award.
All of the cases relied upon by Plaintiff to support her
argument were decided prior to the enactment of the above statute
and, therefore, are not controlling.

Accordingly, the trial

court's decision to terminate alimony after a time period equal to
the length of the parties' marriage, conformed with statute and was
not an abuse of discretion.
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VII
THE PLAINTIFF'S INTENTIONAL ACTIONS
IN
DELAYING
THESE
PROCEEDINGS
CONSTITUTES AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR
AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION.
The

trial

court

specifically

found

that

the

Plaintiff

intentionally delayed this matter for a period of fifteen months in
1993 and 1994 in order to take advantage of a brighter outlook in
the auto dealerships.

(Findings of Fact 55, 56 and 57).

The

specific nature of Plaintiff's delay is set forth above, supra. 2325.
If Plaintiff allowed this divorce to proceed in 1993, it is
likely

that

the

significantly

businesses

lower

value.

would

have

Plaintiff's

been
own

valued

at

appraiser,

a

David

Dorton, valued Mr. Barber's interests at $525,000 as of April 30,
1993

(T. at 734; Exhibit 34 at its 24) .

businesses at $662,000 as of April 30, 1995.

He then valued the
(T. at 739; Exhibit

35 at its 30) . Both of Mr. Dorton's valuations did not include any
discounts which the court has found necessary and appropriate in
this matter.

Obviously, the Plaintiff has received a significant

windfall through her delaying tactics.
The

extent

to which Plaintiff

seeks to benefit

intentional delays permeates this entire appeal.

from her

Because 1994 and

to a lesser extent 1995 had unusually high sales (Finding of Fact
No. 24), Plaintiff constantly refers only to those years as a basis
for

establishing

businesses.

Mr.

Barber's

income

and

the

value

of

the

Sam Barber made one of the more cogent points at trial
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when he pointed out that Plaintiff not only was able to use the
best two years in the business cycle through her delaying actions,
but also wanted to rely on only those two years.
The

trial

court

could

have,

and

(T. at 1132) .

arguably

should

have,

disregarded the effect of the 1994 and 1995 financial statements on
the businesses and valuations based upon the court's
findings regarding Plaintiff's delay.

specific

However, in light of the

lower court's willingness to consider those records as part of the
business valuations, substantial latitude should be afforded the
trial

court's

decision.

Accordingly,

Defendant

asserts

that

Plaintiff's delay represents an alternative basis for upholding the
trial court's decision.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO AWARD
PLAINTIFF HER COSTS OR ATTORNEYS
FEES.
The decision to award attorneys fees and the amount of such
fees fall within the sound discretion of the trial court.
v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993).

Morgan

Any such award

"must be based on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need
for attorneys fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested award."

I&.

As set forth in the discussion regarding the parties' income
and expenses above, Plaintiff does not have the need for assistance
with her attorneys fees and Sam Barber certainly does not have the
ability

to pay

them

based

upon
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their

respective

incomes

and

expenses.

Supra,4-6.

Moreover, the Plaintiff has the benefit of

the $64,159 payment that she can utilize to retire all of her
attorneys

fees

and

costs

which

Sam

Barber

was

required

to

immediately pay.
Moreover, in light of the trial courtfs finding that Plaintiff
intentionally delayed these proceedings, the trial court's Order
that Plaintiff should pay for the costs of Mr. Dorton's final
evaluation seems eminently reasonable.

Therefore, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by failing to award Plaintiff her
costs or attorneys fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Findings of Fact entered in this matter were
all supported by substantial evidence presented at trial.

Sam

Barber does not have the ability to remove as salary the charitable
contributions of the businesses in which he owns an interest.

In

any event, Plaintiff has already been awarded the value of these
contributions through the business payout.
The business interests were more than fairly valued by the
court

and

inured to the Plaintiff's benefit.

Plaintiff

will

receive a sum from the business payout that is substantially larger
than the amount she would have received if she had not
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intentionally

delayed

this

matter.

Therefore,

Defendant

respectfully requests that the Findings and Decree entered by the
trial court following six and one-half days of trial be affirmed.
Dated this 23rd day of March. 1998.
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RE: ALL ISSUES RELATING
TO DIVORCE

PATRICIA BARBER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Judge: Michael D. Lyon
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR.,
Civil No. 924901656DA
Defendant.
ooOoo
Trial

of

the

above-entitled

matter

regarding

all

issues

pertaining to the parties' divorce came on regularly before the
Court on February 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 21 and 28, 1996, before the
Honorable Michael D. Lyon.

Plaintiff was present and represented

by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley and Defendant was present and
represented by his attorney Douglas B. Thomas of the law firm of
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Shaw and Thomas.

The Court having heard

extensive testimony presented by the parties and their experts and
having carefully reviewed the evidence, memoranda and post-trial
arguments submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
The

The parties were initially married on September 10, 1971.

parties

were

later

divorced.

The

parties

remarried

on

September 10, 1977.
2.

This matter was bifurcated and the Plaintiff was granted

a divorce from Defendant pursuant to a hearing held on January 29,
1996.

The divorce was final on February 7, 1996. The parties were

married 18 years, 5 months.
3.

Two

children have been born as

issue

of

the

second

marriage, Angela, born December 25, 1977 and Adrian, born May 29,
1981.
4.

At the time of the divorce, Mrs. Barber was age 44 and

Mr. Barber was age 45.
5.

The parties

have

stipulated

that

Plaintiff

shall

be

awarded the sole care, custody and control of the minor children,
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation.
6.

Plaintiff is employed at Dillard's as a retail sales

clerk in the amount of $1,213.00 per month.
7.

Defendant is employed by Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile

in the approximate amount of $86,000 per year.

The Court finds

that the Defendant testified that he currently earns a base salary
in the amount of $78,000 per year plus an average annual bonus of
$8,000.

In addition, the Defendant receives approximately $6,600

annually in personal automobile use for himself and the parties'
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daughter Angela plus $600 per year in the personal use of credit
cards, $500 per year in the personal use of a cabin owned by his
business interests, health club dues in the annual amount of $1,100
per year and $1,500 for the family's portion of business trips
taken by Mr. Barber.

Totalling these amounts together, the'Court

finds that Mr. Barber has an annual income of $96,300 including
automobile use and the value of his perks, which amounts to a
monthly income of $8,025.
8.

Based on the parties' incomes as set forth above, the

Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the amount of
$687 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support Guidelines.
9.

The

Court

finds

that

the

value

of

the

charitable

contributions paid by the entities in which Mr. Barber owns a
business

interest

should

not

be

attributable

to Mr.

Barber's

personal income. The contributions were added back into the income
stream of the businesses by each of the business appraisers and
then multiplied by a factor of 1.25

to 4.5, depending on the

valuation, to establish the value of the businesses.
is

receiving

interests.

one-half

of

the value

of

Mrs. Barber

Mr. Barber's

business

It would be inequitable and a "double charge" to add

the charitable contributions both to the value of the businesses
for valuation purposes and to Mr. Barber's personal income for
purposes of computing alimony and child support.
10.

The parties own real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah

that shall be sold and equally divided between the parties after
3
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costs

associated

qualified

realtor

with

selling

shall

be

the property

engaged

to

list

are

deducted.

A

the property

the

property for sale.
11.

Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at

4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah.

The home has a fair market

value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving
$18,000 equity which should be divided equally by the parties.

The

Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below.
12.

Each

party

shall

be

awarded

the

personal

property

currently in their own possession.
13.

Mrs. Barber should return the automobile that is in her

possession to the business.

Mr. Barber should not be responsible

for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use.
14.

.The parties shall each be entitled to one half of the

$1,800 currently held by Defendant in an IRA account.
15.
owns a

Mr. Barber owns a business interest in five entities. He
51.5 percent interest in Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmoblie,

a 3 9.03 percent interest in Barber Bros. Motor Co.,

a 44 percent

interest in Barber Bros. Imports, a 25 percent interest in Barber
Bros. Automotive Services, and a 25 percent interest in Barber
Bros. Family Partnership.

The remaining interests are held in

varying degrees by Mr. Barber's three brothers, Charles, Fred and
John.
16.

Barber Bros.

Imports, Barber Bros.

Pontiac-Olds, and

4
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Barber Bros. Automotive Services are all subchapter S Corporations.
Barber Bros. Motor Co. is regular subchapter
Partnership

"C" corporation.

Barber Bros.

Family

partnership.

Sam Barber actively manages only the Barber Bros.

Pontiac-Olds dealership.

is, as the name

indicates, a

He is not involved in the day-to-day

operation of the other entities.
17.

The Court finds that all of the Barber Bros, entities are

undercapitalized

and

cannot

sustain

a

substantial

capital

withdrawal without endangering the businesses.
18.
cyclical.

The Court finds that the automobile industry is very
The Court finds that the sales year of 1994 was somewhat

of an aberration in that it produced substantially higher sales
than in other years.
19.

The

Court

finds

that

the

value

of

the

Oldsmobile

franchise has substantially dropped in recent years in terms of
sales.

The Court further finds that General Motors Project 2000 is

a real issue that will cause a consolidation in franchising.

There

is a very high probability that the Oldsmobile franchise will be
lost to the Barber Bros. Pontiac-Olds dealership within the next
three years.

Although General Motors will provide the dealership

with some form of a buyout for this franchise, the Court finds that
it will not likely amount to a great deal of money.
20.

Although there is no guarantee that the

Pontiac-Olds

dealership will keep the Pontiac franchise, the Court finds that
Mr. Barber runs a very good business and that he will very likely
5
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keep the Pontiac line.
21.

Four separate business appraisers valued Mr. Barber's

business interests and presented testimony and valuations to the
Court.

The Court finds that the methods involved in valuing the

businesses did not involve a precise science but involved critical
junctures

where

the

valuators

could

exercise

substantial

discretion.
22.

Mrs. Barber presented two business valuations, one by

Kevin Yeanoplos which valued Mr. Barber's business interests at
$1.6

million,

businesses

and

a second

at $1,351,300.

by David

Dorton which valued

Mr. Dorton had

in fact valued

the
the

business interests on two prior occasions pursuant to this divorce
action and had valued Mr. Barber's interests at $662,500 in a
valuation dated April 30, 1995, effective December 31, 1993.
23.

The

Court

is critical

of

Plaintiff's

valuations

for

several reasons.

First, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton

factored

risks

in

the

of

the

General

Motors

Project

restructuring of dealerships into their valuations.

2000

The Court

finds that the restructuring by General Motors presents a very real
and substantial likelihood that the Oldsmobile line will be lost by
the Pontiac-Olds dealership within the next three years.
24.

Second, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton took into

account the cyclical nature of the automobile dealership in their
valuations.

Mr. Dorton's credibility was particularly strained

because he dramatically increased (approximately doubled) the value
6
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of Mr. Barber's business interests solely based on sales in 1994,
which was unusual in that it was the best year the automotive
industry had ever had, and to a lesser extent on 1995.
25.

Third, both Mr. Dorton and Mr. Yeanoplos based their

valuations on Mr. Barber's continued skills, talents and abilities
in operating the businesses.

Yet Mr. Barber testified that at the

values contained in Plaintiff's appraisals he could not keep the
businesses and they would need to be sold.

The Court found this

testimony credible and supported by the evidence.
26.

Fourth, the businesses are currently undercapitalized.

If Mr. Barber attempted to make a 20 year payout to Mrs. Barber
based on the $1.2 million or $1.35 million values suggested by Mr.
Yeanoplos and Mr. Dorton, Mr. Barber would need to raid the
businesses to try to meet the obligation which would further
undercapitalize the businesses and compound the problem.
27.

Finally, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton considered

minority or marketability discounts nor the effect of 'capital gains
taxes if Mr. Barber's interests need to be sold.
28.

The Court finds that Mr. Yeanoplos has had no experience

in valuing an automobile dealership and very little in-depth
experience

in

appraising

other

types

of

businesses,

having

primarily operated at a superficial level and giving opinions over
the telephone.
29.

The Court finds that Mr. Yeanoplos utilized two methods

to value the businesses, the capitalization of earnings method,
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which

valued

Mr.

Barber's

interests

at

$1,276,000,

and

the

capitalization of excess earnings or treasury method which valued
the interests at $1.9 million.
30.

The Court finds the capitalization of excess earnings or

treasury method not credible as applied to this matter and chooses
to disregard it completely.

This method was so far out of line

with the other valuations that it was completely unrealistic and
the Court had no confidence in it.

Accordingly, the Court will

only consider Mr. Yeanoplos's valuation at $1,276,000.
31.

Mr. Barber also presented two business valuations.

Mark

Papanikolas, the CPA for the Barber Bros, entities, valued
Mr. Barber's interests at $473,700.

Kent Schmidt valued only Mr.

Barber's interests in the three car dealerships:

Barber Bros.

Pontiac Olds, Barber Bros. Imports and Barber Bros. Motor Co.,
which he valued at a total of $574,580.
32.

Because Mr. Schmidt did not value the Automotive Services

or Family Partnership businesses, the Court has taken an average of
the after-discount value (more fully explained in paragraphs 3 5 and
41 below) of the other three valuations for Automotive Services
($90,160 - Yeanoplos; $86,800 - Dorton; ($59,700 - Papanikolas) and
imputed

to Mr. Schmidt a value of

Services.

$78,886

for the Automotive

The Court has taken an after-discount average of only

Mr. Dorton's and Mr. Yeanoplos's figures
$60,872

- Dorton)

Schmidt

a

value

for the Family
of

$62,916

for

($64,960 - Yeanoplos;

Partnership
that

imputing

entity.

With

to Mr.
these

8

350

imputations, Mr. Schmidt's total business value equals $716,383.
33.

The Court finds Mr. Schmidt's valuation and testimony

highly credible.

Mr. Schmidt has vast years of experience in

valuing automobile businesses and has valued over 100 automobile
dealerships

and

franchises.

The

Court

finds

that

substantial practical hands-on insight and experience.

he

had

The Court

finds that the methodology that Mr. Schmidt used made a lot of
sense and provided validation for the Court's assessment of the
true value of Mr. Barber's business interests as set forth below.
34.

The Court initially struggled with Mr. Papanikolas's

objectivity because of his long standing relationship with the
Barber Bros, entities and his and his sister's financial dealings
with certain of the entities.

However, as the Court listened to

Mr. Papanikolas's testimony at trial, the Court found his testimony
to be credible and helpful.

For example, the Court finds his

testimony regarding the applicability of minority and marketability
discounts in this case to be reasonable and conservative.

The

Court finds his testimony to be honest and veracious. He had good
insight into the automotive business as the accountant for the
Barber Bros, entities for a number of years and as an accountant
for another

dealership.

The

Court

also gave his testimony

credibility because he understood Project 2000.

He understood the

cyclical nature of the automobile industry and the precarious
nature of the Oldsmobile franchise.

The Court, therefore, elects

to utilize his valuation to provide perspective to the decision as
9
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set forth below.
35.
(except

The Court finds that a minority discount of 30 percent
in

the

Pontiac-Olds

dealership)

and

a

marketability

discount of 2 0 percent is reasonable and conservative and should be
applied to the valuations of Mr. Dorton and Mr. Yeanoplos.

Similar

discounts were already taken by Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Papanikolas.
There are several reasons why discounts are appropriate in this
case, any one of which would support the Court's decision to apply
the discounts.
36.

First, the credible testimony at trial clearly indicated

that Mr. Barber does not exercise control over his brothers and
does not exercise day-to-day responsibility over the businesses
other than the Pontiac-Olds dealership.

Even in the Pontiac-Olds

store, Mr. Barber is not free to simply do whatever he wishes
without ruining the working relationship he has with his brothers.
These constraints limit the value of the stock in the entities
which Mr. Barber owns a minority interest, both to Mr. Barber and
to any possible future investor.
37.

Second,

businesses,

the

Project

undercapitalization

2000

and

other

risks

problems,
associated

in

the

with

the

business, combined with Mr. Barber's financial obligations pursuant
to this divorce, create a real possibility that Mr. Barber will
need to sell a portion or all of his interests in the foreseeable
future.

At that time, Mr. Barber will not only likely sustain

these discounts, but could also likely suffer a very substantial
10
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capital gain tax based on his low tax basis in the business.
Accordingly,

the

Papnikolas's

use

Court
of

finds

these

that

discounts

Mr.
in

Schmidt's
their

and

Mr.

valuations

is

appropriate and that it is fair and equitable that these discounts
be applied to Mr. Dorton's and Mr. Yeanoplos's valuations.
38.

Third, the Court specifically finds Mr. Papanikolas's

reliance on the treatises Valuing Small Businesses and Professional
Practices

by

Shannon

Pratt, The

Estate

Planning

and

Taxation

Coordinator, and the NADA Publication: A Dealer Guide to

...

Valuing an Automobile Dealership was appropriate in determining the
discounts in this matter.
39.

Fourth, if the Plaintiff's valuations are accepted, these

businesses will need to be sold now and the parties will not only
immediately

sustain

these

discounts,

substantial capital gains taxes.

they

will

also

suffer

Mr. Barber's tax basis in these

businesses is currently $250,000 which means a sale could result in
a tax liability to the parties in a range substantially in excess
of

$100,000, which would

assets.

further deplete

the parties' marital

In addition, Mr. Barber would lose his job and the ability

to pay alimony to Plaintiff.

By applying the discounts, it brings

the values into a range where Mr. Barber should be able to keep the
business interests and pay Mrs. Barber her long-term business buy
out and also pay her alimony, which is in her best interests.
40.
Mr.

Finally, by applying the discounts to Mr. Yeanoplos's and

Dorton's

valuations, all

the valuations

are brought

into

11
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relatively close parity which provides the Court with a sense of
reliability because the more credible appraisers, Mr. Schmidt and
Mr. Papanikolas, applied the discounts.
41.

Therefore, applying the discounts to the valuations of

Mr. Yeanoplos and Mr. Dorton would yield the following results:
YEANOPLOS VALUATION

Company

Pre-Discount
Value

Discount

PostDiscount
Value

Pont. Olds

$514,000

20%

$411,200

Motor Co.

302,000

30% and 20%

169,120

Imports

183,000

30% and 20%

102,480

Auto. Serv.

161,000

30% and 20%

90,160

Fam. Part.

116,000

30% and 20%

64,960

TOTAL

$1,276,000

$837,920

DORTON VALUATION

Company

Pre-Discount
Value

Discount

PostDiscount
Value

Pont. Olds

$535,600

20%

$428,480

468,400

30% and 20%

262,304

83,600

30% and 20%

46,816

Auto. Serv.

155,000

30% and 20%

86,800

Fam. Part.

108,700

30% and 20%

60,872

TOTAL

$1,351,300

Motor Co.
Imports

$885,272
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42.

The Court finds that the value of Mr. Barber's business

interests are most appropriately determined by taking an average of
the post-discount valuations of the four appraisers (Yeanoplos $837,920; Dorton - $885,272; Schmidt - $716,383; and Papanikolas $473,700) which equals $728,318. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber
is entitled to one-half of this amount, or $364,159.
43.

Mr. Barber should immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159.

Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check
should be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L.
Neeley.
44.

The Court finds the remaining $300,000 should be paid to

Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount should
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 201
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full.

The Court

finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber should bear an annual
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the
above payment schedule is based.
45.

Mrs. Barber should be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's

stock in the business interests until such time as the payments
owed to Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full.
46.

With respect to the alimony issue, the Court finds that

Mr. Barber has a gross income of $8,025 per month.

His taxes are

13
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$2,729 per month leaving him with a net income of $5,296 per month.
If

Mr.

Barber's

monthly

child

support

subtracted, he has $4,609 per month.

obligation

of

$687

is

If Mr. Barber's monthly

business payout to Mrs. Barber of $2,117 is deducted, Mr. Barber
has a disposable income of $2,4 92 per month through May of 1999,
after which Mr. Barber will have $2,879 per month because his
monthly

child

support

obligation

of

$687 will

cease

but

his

business payout will increase by $300.
47.

The Court finds that Mr. Barber's reasonable monthly

expenses are somewhere between $3,200 per month and $3,680 per
month, leaving him a shortfall of somewhere between $708 and $1,188
per month for the next three years.
48.

The Court finds that during most of the marriage Mrs.

Barber was a homemaker and did not work.
school education and one year of college.

Mrs. Barber has a high
With the exception of

one-year when she worked as a substitute teacher, Mrs. Barber did
not work prior to the parties' separation in 1992.
49.

The Court finds that Mrs. Barber has obtained employment

as a retail sales clerk for Dillards earning a gross income of
$1,213 per month less taxes of $218 per month leaving her with a
net income of $995.

Adding the $687 that Mrs. Barber will receive

in child support, Mrs. Barber will have a net disposable income of
$1,682.
disposable

If the business buyout

is then added, she will have

income of $3,799 per month through May of 1999 and

$3,412 per month thereafter, if Mr. Barber were to pay no alimony.
14
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50.

For most of the marriage, the entire family's standard of

living was somewhere around $3,300 per month in disposable income.
During the marriage the parties also had their personal automobile
use provided, $50 per month in the personal use of business credit
cards, the personal use of a cabin owned by Mr. Barber's business
interests worth approximately $500 annually, the payment of family
health club dues in the annual amount of $1,100 per year and $1,500
for the family's portion of business trips taken by Mr. Barber
which the business paid for.
51.

The Court finds that Mrs. Barber's reasonable monthly

living expenses for her and Adrian are $3,345.

Subtracting $3,345

from her disposable income of $3,799 per month leaves Mrs. Barber
with a surplus of $454 per month through June of 1999 and $67
thereafter, assuming no alimony is awarded.
52.

However, because Mrs. Barber is required to live in part

on her property distribution from the businesses to meet her needs,
the Court finds that it is equitable to award Mrs. Barber alimony
in the amount of $300 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per
month thereafter to the extent that the total alimony award does
not

run

for a period

longer than the period of

the parties'

marriage of 18 years, 5 months.
53.

This

alimony

award

will

provide

Mrs.

Barber

with

surpluses of $754 per month through May of 1999 and $567 per month
thereafter even assuming her expenses do not drop after Adrian
turns 18 and graduates from high school.

The award will also

15

35V

result in Mr. Barber sustaining a shortfall in his monthly living
expenses of somewhere between $1,008 and $1,488 per month through
May of 1999. Mr. Barber's shortage will thereafter be between $821
and $1,301 per month because his monthly child support obligation
of $687 will cease but his monthly business payout will increase by
$300 and his monthly alimony obligation will increase by $200.
54.

The Court finds that both parties will likely receive

salary increases in the future, but that Mr. Barber will likely
receive

larger

future salary increases

than Mrs. Barber which

should work to his benefit in alleviating his monthly shortfall.
55.

As a partial justification for Mrs. Barber having to

utilize a portion of her business payout to support herself, the
Court finds Mrs. Barber intentionally delayed obtaining new counsel
for nearly six months in 1993 and 1994 after Mr. Martin Custen
withdrew as her attorney.
56.

The

Court

further

finds

that

after

Mr.

Neeley

was

obtained as Mrs. Barber's counsel, he intentionally delayed Mr.
Barber's prior counsel, Judy Barking, in moving this matter forward
for a period of an additional nine months in 1994 and 1995 because
he anticipated a brighter outlook for the automobile industry.

The

Court holds Mr. Neeley in high regard ethically and deems his delay
to be just an act of advocacy.
to

the

benefit

of

However, the delay clearly inured

Plaintiff

and

detriment

of

Defendant.

Accordingly, Mrs. Barber should pay for all of the costs associated
with Mr. Dorton's final valuation.
16
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57.

If the Court had more fully understood what had occurred

regarding the delays, the Court may have made the parties rely on
the prior valuations that had been completed which would have
valued

the businesses

additional alimony.

lower but allowed

for the payment of

However, the Court believes that it has the

responsibility to use the most current information available at the
time of the divorce and, accordingly, has made its decision on that
basis.
58.

The Court finds that the four Barber brothers all take

approximately equal salaries.

There are slight differences based

on bonuses and meeting their objectives.

Fred Barber's salary is

higher because he pays for his parents' car and also receives a
good business bonus.
59.

The Court finds that in setting the salaries in each of

the Barber Bros, entities, the four Barber brothers have a high
degree of trust and respect for each other and are not inclined to
do anything that would be unfair or heavy handed.

The business

relationship between the brothers has worked well because each
brother has been reluctant to take a hard stand on issues but
defers to what the majority wanted. Because of this high degree of
respect, the Court finds that Mr. Barber cannot do whatever he
wants, even though he owns a majority interest in the Pontiac-Olds
dealership.

The Court finds that he cannot fix his salary without

consideration
approval.

of his brother's

feelings

and

obtaining

their

For Mr. Barber to take out the high salary would cause
17
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great disharmony and disruption of the businesses.
60.

The Court finds that Mr. Barber's ability to generate

income has been diminished.

Since his unfortunate airplane crash

in August of 1995 where he lost one of his eyes, he suffers fatigue
and can only function three or four hours maximum.

Mr. Barber has

been required to hire people to perform some of the functions that
he formerly was able to perform.

The loss of his eye is going to

limit Mr. Barber's ability to generate income in the long run which
also constitutes one of the reasons the court was reluctant to set
a higher alimony award.
61.

The

Court

finds

that

Mr.

Barber's

parents

have

established an education fund in the amount of $12,000 that Angela
may use for her college education.

The Court further finds that

the Defendant is a responsible parent that will assist Angela in
her education so long as Angela is a responsible student.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff shall be awarded the sole care, custody and

control of the parties' minor child, Adrian, born May 29, 1981,
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation.
2.

Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the

amount of $687.00 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support
Guidelines. Child support shall be paid on the fifth and twentieth
days of each month and shall terminate when the child reaches the
age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school with his
regular graduating class, whichever occurs later.
18
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3.

The parties real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah shall

be sold and equally divided between the parties after costs
associated with selling the property are deducted.

A qualified

realtor shall be engaged to list the property for sale.
4.

Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at

4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah.

The home has a fair market

value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving
$18,000 equity which shall be divided equally by the parties. The
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below.
5.

Each

party

shall

be

awarded

the personal

property

currently in their own possession.
6.

Mrs. Barber shall return the automobile that is in her

possession to the business.

Mr. Barber shall not be responsible

for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use.
7.

The parties shall each receive one half of the $1,800

currently held by Defendant in an IRA account.
8.

Mr. Barber shall pay Mrs. Barber $3 64,159 as payment of

her half of Mr. Berber's business interests acquired during the
parties' marriage.
9.

Mr. Barber should immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159.

Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check
should be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L.
Neeley.
10.

The Court finds the remaining $300,000 should be paid to
19
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Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount should
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 2 01
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full.

The Court

finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber should bear an annual
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the
above payment schedule is based.
11.

Mrs. Barber should be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's

stock in the business interests until such time as the payments
owed to Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full.
12.

Mr. Barber shall pay alimony to Mrs. Barber in the amount

of $3 00 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per month thereafter
to the extent that the alimony does not last longer than the
parties' marriage of 18 years, five months.
13.

Mrs. Barber shall pay all the costs associated with Mr.

Dorton's final evaluation.
iluation.
DATED this

O
'
5/

^^.

VJy^Sl
(CJ%

day
of
day of

, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

V

Michael D. Lyon
D i s t r i c t Court Jv/dge
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Approved as to form:

Robert L. Neeley
-ey
Attorney for Plaintiff

?
/
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
PATRICIA BARBER,
:
:

Plaintiff,
V.

DECREE RE: ALL ISSUES
RELATING TO DIVORCE

ftffl 3 1 Y3%

:

Judge: Michael D. Lyon
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR.,
:
:

Defendant.

Civil No. 924901656DA

ooOoo
Trial

of

the

above-entitled

matter

regarding

all

issues

pertaining to the parties' divorce came on regularly before the
Court on February 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 21 and 28, 1996, before the
Honorable Michael D. Lyon.

Plaintiff was present and represented

by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley and Defendant was present and
represented by his attorney Douglas B. Thomas of the law firm of
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Shaw and Thomas.

The Court having heard

extensive testimony presented by the parties and their experts and
having carefully reviewed the evidence, memoranda and post-trial
arguments submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the

MICROFILM wriil
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premises, and the court being fully advised in the matter, and
having made

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW

THEREFOR,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff shall be awarded the sole care, custody and

control of the parties' minor child, Adrian, born May 29, 1981,
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation.
2.

Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the

amount of $687.00 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support
Guidelines.

Child support shall be paid on the fifth and twentieth

days of each month and shall terminate when the child reaches the
age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school with his
regular graduating class, whichever occurs later.
3.
be

sold

The parties real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah shall
and

equally

divided

between

the

parties

associated with selling the property are deducted.

after

costs

A qualified

realtor shall be engaged to list the property for sale.
4.

Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at

4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah.

The home has a fair market

value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving
$18,000 equity which shall be divided equally by the parties.

The

Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below.
5.

Each

party

shall

be

awarded
2

the

personal

property

currently in their own possession.
6.

Mrs. Barber shall return the automobile that is in her

possession to the business.

Mr. Barber shall not be responsible

for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use.
7.

The parties shall each receive one half of the $1,800

currently held by Defendant in an IRA account.
8.

Mr. Barber shall pay Mrs. Barber $3 64,159 as payment of

her half of Mr. Berber's business interests acquired during the
parties' marriage.
9.

Mr. Barber shall immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159.

Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check
shall be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L.
Neeley.
10.

The Court finds the remaining $300,000 shall be paid to

Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount shall
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 2 01
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full.

The Court

finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber shall bear an annual
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the
above payment schedule is based.
11.

Mrs. Barber shall be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's stock
3

3

in the business interests until such time as the payments owed to
Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full.
12.

Mr. Barber shall pay alimony to Mrs. Barber in the amount

of $300 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per month thereafter
to the extent that the alimony does not last longer than the
parties' marriage of 18 years, five months.
13.

Mrs. Barber shall pay all the costs associated with Mr.

Dorton's final evaluation.

DATED this

&7

\LJ&

day of

, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

'W. V JAp^

Michae
el D. Lyon
r^
District Court Judg^

Approved as to form:

Robert L. Nee
Attorney for Plaintiff

4
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*****

PATRICIA BARBER,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.

COURT RULING
CASE NO. 924901656

SAM JOHN BARBER, JR. ,
DEFENDANT.
*****

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE 1996.
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:
*****

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

ROBERT L. NEELEY

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

DOUGLAS B. THOMAS
*****

o
o

REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR
847 E. 2800 N.
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414
OFS. 399-8405, HM. 782-3146
CD
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OGDEN, UTAH
THE COURT:
THE CASE MAY BE.

JUNE 24, 1996

HELLO.

1:10 P.M.

GOOD MORNING OR AFTERNOON, AS

LET ME PUT YOU ON THE SPEAKER PHONE PLEASE.

GENTLEMEN, AFTER I RENDERED THE DECISION, I GUESS IT'S
BEEN WELL OVER A WEEK AGO, I THEN WENT ON VACATION AND CAME
BACK AND TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH MR. THOMAS AND HE WAS ON
VACATION, AND I GUESS THIS IS THE SOONEST THAT WE'VE BEEN ABLE
TO GET TOGETHER.
LET ME INDICATE TO BOTH OF YOU THAT AT THE TIME THAT I
RENDERED THE DECISION IN BARBER VERSUS BARBER, I HAD UNSETTLED
FEELINGS ABOUT THE EQUITIES AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF NOT
AWARDING ALIMONY TO MRS. BARBER.

I DID RESERVE THE ISSUE BY

GRANTING HER A DOLLAR A YEAR IN ALIMONY, BUT FELT THAT UNDER
THE FINANCIAL SCHEME AND THE BUY OUT OF THE EQUITY IN THE
BUSINESS, THAT THERE REALLY WAS NO ROOM FOR ALIMONY.

AND AT

THE TIME FELT LIKE THAT WAS JUST THE APPROPRIATE THING TO DO.
BUT AS I SOMETIMES DO, I HAVE A TENDENCY TO RUMINATE A LITTLE
BIT ABOUT SOME OF THE DECISIONS THAT I MAKE, AND THE MORE I
THOUGHT ABOUT THIS ONE, THE MORE CONVINCED I BECAME THAT THE
DECISION THAT I HAD RENDERED WAS NOT APPROPRIATE.

AND

THEREFORE, I INTEND AT THIS TIME TO AMEND THE DECISION SO AS
TO EFFECTUATE MORE EQUITY IN WHAT THE COURT DID.
I'M LOOKING AT MY DECISION, AT LEAST THE OUTLINE OF THE
POINTS THAT I GAVE YOU IN MY DECISION, AND I DON'T KNOW WHERE
TO REALLY KIND OF TELL YOU TO PICK THIS UP, EXCEPT THAT LET ME

JUST GO OVER THE FIGURES THAT I HAD AND MAYBE IF YOU'VE TAKEN
NOTES, YOU CAN SEE WHERE THIS IS.
I SHOWED HIM HAVING A GROSS INCOME, MONTHLY INCOME OF
$8,025, WITH 2,729 SUBTRACTED FOR TAXES, LEAVING A NET INCOME
OF 5,296.

AND THEN THE CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT OF $687, FOR

DISPOSABLE INCOME OF 4,609.

AND THEN I HAD A PAY OUT OF

PLAINTIFF'S EQUITY SHARE OF $2,417, LEAVING HIM DISPOSABLE
INCOME OF $2,197.
AND WITHOUT GOING DOWN THROUGH ALL THE REST OF IT, I THEN
SHOWED HER HAVING INCOME OF $1,213, WITH 218 SUBTRACTED FOR
TAXES, LEAVING A NET INCOME OF $995, WITH CHILD SUPPORT OF 687
GIVING HER DISPOSABLE INCOME OF $1,682.

THEN I ADDED TO HER

THE EQUITY PAYMENT OF 2,417, BROUGHT HER UP TO A DISPOSABLE
INCOME OF $4,099.
WHAT I HAD PROBLEMS WITH IS THAT I DON'T FEEL THAT IT'S
ENTIRELY EQUITABLE TO REQUIRE HER TO -- IN ORDER TO SUBSIST,
TO LIVE OFF OF THE EQUITY THAT SHE IS GETTING OUT OF THIS
BUSINESS WHEN HE IN TURN IS NOT HAVING TO DO THAT.

NOW, AS A

PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE SOME
COMBINATION OF THAT, BUT NOT TO GIVE HER ANY ALIMONY, WHICH IS
EFFECTIVELY WHAT I DID WHEN I ONLY GAVE HER A DOLLAR A YEAR, I
THINK IS AN INJUSTICE.

AND THEREFORE, WHAT I HAVE DECIDED TO

DO IS I'M GOING TO GIVE HER THE 2,417, BUT I'M GOING TO
DENOMINATE $300 OF THAT AS ALIMONY.

SO THAT SHE WILL --HE

WILL MAKE A $300 A MONTH ALIMONY PAYMENT AND AN EQUITY PAYMENT
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OF $2,117 A MONTH FOR THE TOTAL OF 2,417.
UNDER THAT KIND OF ANALYSIS, IT'S TRUE SHE DOES HAVE A
SURPLUS, BUT THE ONLY REASON SHE HAS A SURPLUS IS BECAUSE OF
HER EQUITY PAYMENT. AND I'M NOT SURE THE LAW WOULD EXPECT HER
TO USE HER EQUITY WHEN HE'S NOT HAVING TO USE HIS EQUITY TO
SUPPORT HIMSELF.

SO ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL AN ASPECT OF

THAT, I THINK IT TEMPERS THAT A LITTLE BIT AND MAKES IT MORE
EQUITABLE.

SO THAT ESSENTIALLY, HE WILL PAY HER THEN 687 FOR

CHILD SUPPORT, $300 A MONTH FOR ALIMONY, AND THEN A PAYMENT OF
2,117, AND I BELIEVE THE FIGURES THEN ALL WORK OUT TO BE THE
SAME.
AND THEN AT SUCH TIME AS THE CHILD SUPPORT TERMINATES -AND I'M NOT RECALLING CLEARLY, BUT I THINK THAT'S GOING TO
OCCUR IN THE NEXT FOUR TO SIX YEARS -- WHEN THAT CHILD SUPPORT
FIGURE TERMINATES, THE ALIMONY, IF THERE IS STILL AN
OBLIGATION, WILL INCREASE TO $500 A MONTH -- YEAH, $500 A
MONTH.

AND THE ALIMONY WILL BE EQUAL TO THE LENGTH OF THE

MARRIAGE.

IN OTHER WORDS, THIS WAS A LONG TERM MARRIAGE, BUT

UNDER THE STATUTE NOW, THE COURT CANNOT ORDER ALIMONY LONGER
THAN WAS THE PERIOD OF THE MARRIAGE.

SO THEREFORE, THE

MARRIAGE --OR ALIMONY WILL TERMINATE AFTER THAT TERM.

AND

THEN AT SUCH TIME AS THE CHILD SUPPORT INCREASES TO $500 -- IN
OTHER WORDS, IF THINGS WERE LEFT JUST THE WAY THEY ARE AND THE
ALIMONY FIGURE INCREASES UP TO $500 A MONTH, AT THAT TIME THE
EQUITY PAYMENT WOULD REVERT TO $2,417 A MONTH.
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SO IN EFFECT, WHAT I'M DOING IS DELAYING PART OF THE
EQUITY PAYMENT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW HER TO BE GIVEN
WHAT I THINK IS AN APPROPRIATE SUM OF ALIMONY.

AND I THINK

THAT TECHNICALLY, SHE MAYBE OUGHT TO HAVE MORE, BUT HE CAN'T
PAY MORE AND STILL PAY OUT SOME OF THE EQUITY, AND I THINK
THAT THERE WILL -- THAT JUST BALANCING ALL OF THAT TOGETHER,
THAT THAT WAS THE APPROPRIATE THING THAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE
DONE.
ARE THERE QUESTIONS?
MR. THOMAS:

PERHAPS JUST ONE, YOUR HONOR.

SO BY

REDUCING THE AMOUNT TO 2,117, THAT WILL THEN JUST EXTEND IT
OUT, HE WILL JUST PAY THE SAME INTEREST RATE, IT WILL JUST
EXTEND OUT ANY PAYMENT BEYOND THE TIME PERIOD.
THE COURT:

THAT'S RIGHT.

SO IT MAY PROLONG THE

EQUITY PAYMENT BEYOND THE 20-YEAR AMORTIZATION PERIOD THAT THE
COURT USED.

AND THAT'S ONE OF REASONS WHY THE ALIMONY

PAYMENT'S NOT ANY LARGER THAN IT IS.

I REFLECTED ON IT I

THINK THE NIGHT AFTER I GAVE YOU THE DECISION, I WENT TO BED
AND THOUGHT ABOUT IT. AND I SAW THAT BEING EXTENDED OUT, AND
I KNOW THAT PERHAPS PUTS HIM IN A POSITION WHERE HE MIGHT HAVE
TO WORK A LITTLE LONGER BEYOND AGE 67, BUT MAYBE BY THAT TIME,
HE'S IN A POSITION WHERE HE'S GOING TO SELL OUT HIS INTEREST
IN THE BUSINESS AND HE CAN PAY HER ANYTHING THAT REMAINS AT
THAT TIME.

BUT I THINK THAT IN MY MIND PROVIDES A BALANCE OF

SOME ALIMONY WHICH IS HERS THAT SHE REALLY OUGHT TO HAVE AT
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THIS TIME, AND YET AT THE SAME TIME, GIVES HER A MEANINGFUL
EQUITY INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS AND THERE'S NO TAX CONSEQUENCE
TO HER WITH THAT EQUITY PAYMENT.

THERE WILL BE A SMALL TAX

CONSEQUENCE OF THE ALIMONY, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, MR. BARBER
GETS A TAX BENEFIT FOR THAT.

AND JUST AS I BALANCED THAT AND

I THOUGHT ABOUT MORE AND I THOUGHT ABOUT LESS, BUT THAT SEEMED
TO BE AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT IN MY MIND.
MR. NEELEY:

THAT WAS THE ONLY QUESTION I HAD, JUDGE,

WAS WHAT DOES THAT DO TO THE PAY OUT PERIOD OF TIME, SO IT
JUST EXTENDS THAT UNTIL THE AMOUNT, WHATEVER THAT FIGURES OUT
TO BE AFTER EVERYTHING IS NETTED OUT IS PAID IN FULL.
THE COURT:

RIGHT, EXACTLY.

MR. NEELEY:

ALL RIGHT.

MR. THOMAS:

OKAY.

VERY GOOD.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

MR. THOMAS:

I WILL JUST PREPARE THEM AND GET THEM

OVER TO BOB FOR HIS REVIEW AND INPUT.
MR. NEELEY:

OKAY.

THE COURT:

VERY GOOD. THANKS.

MR. THOMAS:

THANK YOU.

MR. NEELEY:

THANK YOU.

THE COURT:

HAVE A GOOD DAY. BYE.
*****
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One of the most common reasons an appraiser is retained to value a
small business or professional practice is to establish value for a marital
dissolution. In fact, the adoption of the no fault divorce and the application of the equitable distribution of marital property statutes in the
1970s by the various state legislatures significantly influenced the development of the business valuation profession.
Unlike valuations for other purposes, the valuation standards, ap.
praisal methods, and valuation dates are as diverse as the geography of
the 50 states.

Divorce Valuation Survey
In preparation for this chapter, we prepared a survey form on business
valuations for divorce purposes, which was sent to all Accredited Senior
Appraisers certified in business valuation by the American Society of
Appraisers. The survey questions dealt with the appraiser's experience
during the past three years involving business valuations for marital
dissolutions. Information requested included the number of divorce cases
handled, the growth trend of divorce valuations experienced, and the
standards and methods of valuation most commonly used.
Of the 300 forms sent out, 117 responses were received. Of those
appraisers responding, 54 percent had been involved in at least one
divorce valuation during the past three years. The most common reason
why the other 46 percent had not been involved in divorce valuations
was that of the low fees generated. Most likely, the low fees are not
because of the valuation purpose, but because most businesses being
valued for divorces are small businesses and professional practices.
Those that had been involved in divorce valuations in the past three
years averaged 32 divorce valuations during that time period. However,
certain appraisers had specialized in divorce valuations. The top 20 percent of appraisers (based on number of divorce appraisals completed)
averaged 91 cases during the past three years, while the remaining 80
percent averaged 15 cases.
The survey results suggest that the demand for business and professional practice valuations related to marital dissolutions is increasing—
41 percent of the respondents indicated that the divorce cases were growing in number, while only 11 percent saw a decline (another 7 percent
decided not to handle divorce valuations in the future).
The survey respondents, who are generally full-time appraisers, indicated that on average, 41 percent of the other professionals completing
divorce valuations were also full-time business appraisers, 20 percent
were forensic accountants, 17 percent were general accountants, 8 percent were business brokers and the subject company's accountant (each),
and 6 percent were other professionals. Also, professional practice valuation represented 22 percent of all divorce valuations for all appraisers,
while 24 percent of the valuations were of professional practices by those
appraisers (the top 20 percent) handling the most divorce valuations.
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Divorce and Litigation
Obviously, any appraiser considering divorce valuation is considering
litigation valuation. The emotions of the parties in many divorces can
have an impact upon their ability to compromise valuation differences.
We were involved in a case where the total valuation difference between
the appraisers was $25,000, less than 5 percent of the value opined by
either appraiser. Both attorneys and appraisers recommended to their
clients that the difference in value be split as a compromise—a recommendation that was rejected by both parties, even though the cost of
litigating the difference was more than the difference in value. While
this may seem to be a totally illogical choice by the divorcing couple, the
emotions involved as a result of the breakup of the marriage were greater
than the logic suggested by all the professionals representing the parties. 1
Those surveyed appraisers involved in divorce valuations indicated
that 24 percent of all divorce cases ended in litigation where the value
of the business or professional practice was at issue. Those appraisers
specializing in divorce valuations experienced a slightly lower litigation
percentage of 19 percent.2
Because of the high incidence of divorce valuations ending up contested in the courtroom, the appraiser considering valuations for divorce
purposes needs to be well versed in effective testimony methods and
courtroom procedure. Also, as is discussed in the following sections of
this chapter, each state's courts are the primary body that determines
the proper standards of value that are to be used in that state's divorce
cases, so the appraiser in the divorce situation needs to be apprised of
relevant state court precedents.
The valuation of small businesses for divorce purposes requires the
appraiser to be more of an investigative appraiser compared to other
situations that call for valuation. Small businesses tend to have less
reliable, compiled financial statements. Also, many times the parties
have expensed many personal expenses through the business. Therefore,
the appraiser may need to assume a more active role in restating the
financial statements in order to better reflect the economic operations of
the business or reconstruct the revenues and/or expenses of the business
before any valuation of the business is completed. The appraiser who
diligently calculates the correct capitalization rate to apply, but does not
take the time to evaluate the accuracy of the prior financial statements
from an economic point of view, may find that his valuation report is
totally meaningless. Many times, it is advisable for the appraiser to
retain an accountant (or to recommend that the client retain an accountant) to restate the prior income statements and balance sheets if the
appraiser does not have the time or knowledge to produce more reliable
financial statements based on the company's supporting records.
l

Ultimately, the judge adopted one of the appraiser's values and did not split the difference
^This percentage is far higher than for disputed valuations m most other contexts
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Date of Valuation
A question that should always be asked of the divorce attorney by the
appraiser is: What valuation date or dates should be used? Three primary
dates can be used in a divorce proceeding: the date closest to trial, the
date of separation, and the date of marriage. As a general rule, a business
primarily dependent on the efforts of one of the parties getting the divorce
will be valued at the date of separation. Businesses whose success is more
dependent on many individuals, location, underlying asset values, and
so forth, will be valued at a date closest to trial. A date of marriage
valuation is generally necessary where it is claimed that one of the
spouses is only allowed to receive one half (or some percentage) of the
increase in value of the business during the period of marriage.
Many states have rules as to what valuation dates are appropriate,3
while many states do not provide any statute or case law that clarifies
the date. The appropriate date of valuation may be further confused
because the divorcing couple cannot even agree on what date they separated or because the trial date is continually postponed. In one case in
which we were involved, valuations were required for four different
dates: date of marriage, date of separation claimed by the wife, date of
separation claimed by the husband, and the date of trial.
In those situations where the increase in the business's value is the
portion to be divided equitably, the increase in value from the date of
marriage to either the date of separation or date of trial will need to be
calculated by appraising the business as of both dates. Various allocation
formulas can then be applied in order to determine the marital portion
of the business to be divided. There are two primary methods for allocating this increase.
The Periera method treats the value at date of marriage as an investment that should generate an appropriate rate of return during marriage. Therefore, the value of the marital property would be equal to the
assets' date of separation (or trial) value, less the value at date of marriage and the expected normal yearly returns during marriage based on
the value at date of marriage.
The Van Camp method considers the value of services of the employee/spouse during the term of the marriage and compares that value
to the compensation received. If the employee/spouse is underpaid, the
underpayment is allocated as marital property (including a return on
the underpayment to the date of trial).
Generally, the Periera method is preferred by the nonoperatmg
spouse, while the Van Camp method is preferred by the employee/spouse.
While each method can give similar values for the marital property!
it is more likely that the two methods will give extremely different
allocations between marital and separate property values. One method
of resolving a large conflict between the two allocation methods is »
third method, called the Todd method and sometimes referred to as the
3
For example, California professional practices are generally valued at the date of separation,
cial businesses not totally dependent on the owner's efforts are valued as of trial date.
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combination method. An example of this method, along with examples
of the Periera and Van Camp methods, are shown in Exhibit 39-1.

Standard of Value
Most state divorce statutes require the equal or equitable division of the
marital property between the spouses. Many of the state statutes require
that the assets be "valued." However, the statutes themselves are generally silent as to what standard of value should be used in setting the
value. As a result, the states' appellate courts have been responsible for
addressing this issue. This means that there is no universal standard of
value among the various states and, in fact, there is not necessarily a
single standard for all divorce valuations in any single state.
While many divorce courts will use the fair market value standard,
there are many situations where this standard is not necessarily used.
As examples, the required valuation of nonmarketable professional
goodwill or the valuation of licenses or educational degrees cannot be
based on the fair market value standard because these assets cannot be
sold in any marketplace. Therefore, the intrinsic value standard may be
more appropriate.
Many state courts tend to ignore the value set in a company's buy-sell
agreement, even when that agreement may limit the fair market value
of the stock interest to the agreement's stated value. The intrinsic value
of holding onto the company's stock may exceed the buy-sell value. In
fact, only 2 percent of the surveyed appraisers indicated that the court
always follows the buy-sell agreement in setting value, and 11 percent
indicated that the court gives substantial weight to an agreement. On
the other hand, 79 percent of the appraisers indicated that the courts
give some weight to the agreement and another 8 percent indicated little
if any weight is given to buy-sell agreements by the divorce courts.
The appraiser needs to be knowledgeable about the statutory and
case law as related to divorce for each state in which that appraiser
practices so that the applicable standard of value is considered (as well
as the valuation date).
The standard of value used most by the appraisers responding to
the divorce valuation survey was fair market value—84 percent of all
respondents indicated that they had used this standard of value in at
least one divorce valuation during the past three years. However, when
valuing professional practices, only 66 percent of the appraisers indicated that they used the fair market value standard.

Discovery
The reliability of any valuation of a company is primarily contingent on
the accuracy of the information used in the appraisal. Because of the
animosity often attendant in divorce proceedings, the appraiser may find
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Exhibit 39-1

MARITAL PROPERTY ALLOCATION METHODS
Periera Method
Value of Business, Date of Separation
Value of Business, Date of Marriage
Return on Investment, 10% per annum (simple)
Yearl
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Value of Separate Property
Value of Marital Property

$750,000
100,000

10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
(150,000)
$600,000

Van Camp Method
Value of Business, Date of Separation
Market
Compensation
Compensation
Paid
Year 1
60,000
40,000
Year 2
65,000
55,000
Year 3
71,000
55,000
Year 4
77,000
65,000
Year 5
80,000
65,000
Value of Marital Property
Value of Separate Property

$750,000
Diifference
20,000
10,000
16,000
12,000
15,000

Return on
Investment
0
2,000
3,000
4,600
5,800

Total
20,000.
12,000
19,000
16,600
20,800
(88,400)
$661,600

Todd Method (Combination Method)
Return on Separate Property (Periera Method)
Value of Unpaid Services
Total

50,000
88,400
138,400

36.1%
63.9%
100.0%

Value of Separate Property
Value of Business, Date of Separation
Value of Business, Date of Marriage
Increase in Business Value
Separate Property Portion of Increase
Separate Property Increase in Value
Value of Business, Date of Marriage
Value of Separate Property

$750,000
100,000
650,000
x36.1%
234,650
100,000
$334,650

Value of Marital Property
Increase in Business Value
Marital Property Portion of Increase
Value of Marital Property

650,000
x 63.9%
$415.350_
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that one or both of the parties will not be willing to provide the company
information necessary for the valuation of the company. This is frequently a problem for the appraiser who is retained by the nonoperating
spouse. The attorney for the nonoperating spouse will need to rely upon
the appraiser for guidance as to the types of information necessary to be
subpoenaed from the other party and/or the subject company. Therefore,
the appraiser should provide a detailed and specific list of documents
that are necessary. Because the process of subpoenaing documents is
cumbersome, lengthy, and has specific cut-off dates, the appraiser should
ask for all documents that may reasonably exist that may have any
impact on the company value. Many times it is difficult, if not impossible,
to go back for a second (or third) request of documents.
Also, the appraiser may need to interview the company's management by providing the attorney with a list of all questions to be asked
by interrogatory or by deposition. Also, it may be necessary for the appraiser to have the attorney go to the court in order to get permission
for a site visit to the business, or to review records at the business.
Obviously, because the appraisal will only be as good as the information used to reach a value opinion, the ability of the appraiser and attorney, working together, to procure the necessary and complete information is of critical importance to the appraiser.
It should be remembered that the company is not the only source of
documents regarding company information. T
ipany's accountants,
bankers, insurance agents, and attorneys a1
itain information on
the company. These sources of informatioi
.o need to be investigated by the appraiser.

Methods of Valuation
There are no standard methods of valuation for divorce purposes. However,
certain methods tend to be used more than others. Valuation methods using
publicly traded company data (price/earnings multiples, etc.) are typically
not used when valuing small businesses or professional practices. Also,
many state courts have held a business's value resulting from the efforts
of the operating spouse after separation are not marital property. As a
result, divorce courts tend not to use financial projections that are necessary
to complete the discounted future returns method of valuation.
The appraisers responding to the divorce valuation survey indicated
a preference for the capitalization of earnings method of valuation—94
percent of all respondents indicated that they had used the method in
divorce valuations of business interests and 61 percent for professional
practices. Other methods used for business valuation, and the percent
of appraisers that have used them, were as follows:

Prior sales of company
Capitalization of cash flow
Publicly traded companies

Commercial
Businesses

Professional
Practices

77%
73
73

52%
47
26
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Commercial
Businesses
Adjusted book value
Excess earnings method
Revenue multiples
Discounted future returns
Book value multiples
Buy-sell agreement formula
Nonpublic sales, other companies
Merger and acquisition data
Adjusted tangible assets and goodwill
Rules of thumb
Book value (unadjusted)
Liquidation value
Capitalization of dividends
Original investment
Cost to recreate

71
66
58
58
57
55
53
53
44
42
40
39
36
24
24

Professional
Practices
52
62
55
32
32
53
42
24
50
44
37
24
18
23
21

Clearly, the facts of each situation will determine the method of
valuation to be used. For example, a company that is highly profitable
and not intending to liquidate would not be valued using a liquidation
method.

Valuation Discounts
Discounts for taxes, minority interest, and lack of marketability are not
necessarily universal when valuing businesses and professional practices for divorce purposes. In the state of Oregon, for example, the appellate court has held that in a family-owned company, no discounts for
minority interest or marketability are appropriate when valuing an individual family member's interest for divorce purposes.
When using the adjusted book value method, many state courts have
held that no corporate capital gains tax should be considered unless the
tax is immediate and specific. Based on the survey, 51 percent of the
appraisers polled indicated that the courts rarely or never allowed this
discount, while the remainder indicated that the courts usually allowed
the taxes to be computed.
Based on the survey, the application of minority and marketability
discounts was influenced by the factors that might influence the discount. Given a situation where the interest being appraised (for divorce
purposes) represented a minority interest in a company controlled by the
spouse's family, 37 percent of the appraisers would apply a discount, 37
percent sometimes applied a discount, and 26 percent never applied a
discount. On the other hand, given the same situation, 52 percent would
always apply a marketability discount, while 34 percent sometimes applied a discount, and 14 percent would never consider a marketability
discount.
Only 15 percent of the appraisers would usually apply a minority
interest discount for a 50 percent interest in the company, while 58
percent would never apply this discount. If the interest being appraised
represented control, only 21 percent would usually apply a marketability
discount, while 32 percent would never apply such a discount.
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Clearly, the facts in each situation will have a direct impact upon
the application of, and amount of, minority interest and marketability
discounts in divorce valuations.

Summary
Valuations for divorce purposes represent a significant portion of all
professional valuations of small businesses and professional practices.
Our practitioner survey indicated that the demand for professional valuations in connection with divorces is continuing to grow.
A significant proportion (about 20 to 25 percent, according to the
practitioner survey) of all valuations for divorces culminate in litigation.
Divorce valuations are complicated by inconsistencies in standards and
methods of value, and also applicable valuation dates from one jurisdiction to another (and sometimes within the same jurisdiction). The appraiser needs to work closely with the attorney to understand the applicable standards and dates as well as accepted valuation methods in each
case.
Discovery is often more difficult in valuations for divorces than for
other purposes. The appraiser should work closely with the attorney to
ensure adequate discovery.
The appraiser involved in valuations for divorces must be alert and
willing to understand the legal requirements in each case and adopt
procedures and appraisal methodology to meet the respective requirements.
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I.

securities to reflect this disparity. Such discounts are commonly known
non-marketability discounts. In the following discussion we will see he
marketability (or lack thereof) can affect the value of both minority ai
controlltng4nterests.

Minority Interest It is well established that a minority interest in a business enterprise lacks the
Discounts
ability to control the business and is therefore inherently less valuable than a
corresponding controlling interest
The value of a controlling interest lies in its power to exercise any or all of a
variety of rights typically associated with control, including the authority to
do the following:
/
/
/
/
>'
/

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Minority
Interests

Appoint management
Elect directors •
Set management compensation and perks
Set policy and change the course of the business
Acquire or liquidate assets
Make acquisitions
Liquidate, sell, dissolve, or recapitalize the company
Sell or acquire stock
Declare dividends
Change the articles or bylaws

Although these studies took place over a ten-year period, each discovered
average discount of approximately the same amount. Thus we can assume tl
a non-marketability discount is appropriately applied because of its histc
cally observed presence as well as its relative stability.
Studies of non-marketable discounts have centered around comparing am
length transactions of non-marketable stock with the price at which it trac
in a subsequent initial public offering (IPO), and the relationship betwt
sales of restricted securities (securities in a public company that are i
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and are theref
not freely tradable on an exchange) and their publicly traded counterp:
which are reeistered.

Revenue Ruling 59-60 of the Internal Revenue Service states:
/
/

endanfs Exhibit.

»No.
rk's Initials

4^4CYte^-—

Control of a corporation, either actual or in effect, representing as
it does an added element of value, may justify a higher value for a
specific block of stock.

Mr. John D. Emory, ASA, does studies of IPO securities even* year. 1
average discount of these studies is 46 percent. The ranre is from 40 to
percent. (Sec Business Valuation Review, March 1994.)

The size of the minority discount depends upon the present and anticipated
distribution of ownership and other factors which affect voting control. A list
of studies regarding minority interest discounts has been provided in Appendix C. While discounts for minority interests by the courts have generally
ranged from 15 to 60 percent, the average is around 35 percent.
Picking a minority interest discount is always going to be a subjective
judgment, based in part upon the particular ownership situation. As an
example, a 2 percent ownership would carry a much different discount in the
following two situations:
Example 1

Example 2

Owner A: 98%
Owner B: 2%

Owner A: 49%
Owner B: 2%
Owner C: 49%

In each of the above examples, Owner B owns 2 percent of the company;
however in the second example the 2 percent represents swing or control
stock. In the first case owner B is at the mercy of owner A. The minority
interest in Example 1 would therefore have a high discount, and in Example
2, a much lower discount
Non-markctabilitv In Revenue Ruling 77-17, the IRS recognizes that closely held securities
Discounts
{$«**. that are not traded on a public security exchange) lack the inherent
liquidity of publicly traded securities, and "thus arc not as attractive for,
investment purposes.? In other words, they are not as marketable. Accordingly, it is accepted valuation practice to discount the value of closely held
f w b l i i h H by 0»t NinontJ Automobile DcaJcn A J M > O M M M

Various studies involving the non-marketability discount for minority int<
ests have indicated a range of discounts from 7 to 95 percent; however, the
is a consensus among the studies that discounts average approximately
percent

At least 8 studies of restricted securities have been done since 1 %6 by varii
parties. Average discounts for these studies is 34 percent. The range
average discount is 25.8 to 45 percent. {FAIRSHARE. The Matrimonial I
Monthly, Vol.12, No. 6, June 1992.) For more detailed infoimation on tli
studies, refer to the valuation references listed in the bibliography.

\
Controlling
Interests

A

In the case of automobile dealerships being valued on a controlling inte
basis, we need to look at the intrinsic marketability of the underlying comp
as a guide in determining an appropriate non-marketability discount
The primary asset of an automobile dealership is the ability to sell a cer
brand of automobiles, and this asset resides not with the company, but \
a prescribed individual named by the manufacturer/Thus, it is not tcchnic
an asset of the company that can be sold. Most sales agreements (manufac
ers are reluctant to call them "franchises") are structured in this fashion,
for this reason such companies are inherently more difficult to sell. Any i
owner must be approved by the manufacturer as far as the sales agrecme
concerned.
Experience with this type of company indicates that the universe of potei
buyers is not great and selling a dealership is likely to be time consuming
the other hand, a controlling owner can dictate that the company be so
most instances. Thus, the controlling owner is operating from a much r
marketable position than a minority owner, and the non-marketability
count would be less.

Puhliihed by the NtuonaJ Automobile D o t e n

Aiutciaiion

1400 Vtciiptrt D n r t . M c U w v VA 13102

MOO V>cttt>vk D m c . McLean. V A 22102

• N A D A June 1*95. All n | h o rwervtd.

• N A D A Jur»e 1°*>S All h | h u merved.
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ROBERT L . NEELEY # 2 3 7 3
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
2485 Grant A v e . #200
Ogden, Utah 84401
T e l e p h o n e : 6 2 1 - 3 6 4 6 (M ~>
Fax: 621-3652

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

PATRICIA BARBER,
Plaintiff,

]>

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
]1 FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND DIVORCE DECREE

vs.

;

SAM JOHN BARBER, JR.,

]>

Judge: Lyon

]>

Civil No. 924901656

Defendant.

Comes now p l a i n t i f f ,

P a t r i c i a Barber, by and through

her a t t o r n e y of record, Robert L. Neeley, and objects t o
Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Divorce as follows,
1.

to-wit:

P l a i n t i f f objects t o the omission in the proposed

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce t h a t

plaintiff's

property award be secured by a l i e n on one-half of defendant's
stock.

On Page 18 of the Court Ruling on the 10th day of June,

1996, the Court ordered defendant, Sam Barber, t o pay p l a i n t i f f
$64,159.00 as a down payment, the balance t o be secured by a l i e n
(J )»»

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION
BARBER VS BARBER
Civil No. 924901656
Page 2
on one-half of defendant's stock.
2.

Plaintiff objects to proposed Conclusions of Law 9

and 10, together with paragraph 9 and 10 of the Decree of Divorce
and Findings of Fact 43 and 44 relating to the issue of plaintiff
receipt of a down payment of $64,159.00.
3.

The Court, on Page 18 of the Court Ruling, ordered

defendant to pay plaintiff $64,159.00 as a down payment.

On Page

6 of the Court Ruling, the Court suggested that plaintiff's
interest in the Barber Brothers stock be reduced by $9,000.00,
one-half the equity in the family residence located at 4685
Porter Avenue, Ogden, Utah.

Defendant, in preparation of the

pleadings, deducted $9,000.00 from the down payment due plaintiff
rather than offsetting it against plaintiff's interest in
defendant's stock.

The Court ordered plaintiff, Patricia Barber,

to return to defendant her automobile and ordered plaintiff to
pay all of the valuation expenses of David Dorton.

The Court

also ordered each party to pay their own attorney fees.
Plaintiff is in need of the down payment of $64,159.00 to
purchase an automobile and pay her debts.

Defendant's pleadings

do not conform to the Court order that defendant pay $64,159.00
immediately to plaintiff, Patricia Barber.
4.

On Page 5 of the Court Ruling of June 24, 1996, the

Court extended the pay out period for defendant, Sam Barber, to
pay plaintiff her portion of the Barber Brothers stock.

The

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION
BARBER VS BARBER
Civil No. 924901656
Page 3
Court estimated the pay out may take until defendant, Sam Barber,
was age 67.

The Court clearly intended plaintiff, Patricia

Barber, to receive a down payment

of

$64,159.00

and the

balance

to be paid over a twenty to twenty-two year period payable at the
rate of $2,117.00 per month until paid in full.
DATED this

7 ? ^ d a y of September, 1996.

W06ERT L. NEE^EY
~7
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Divorce Decree to defendant's attorney, Douglas B.

C~f'5?!7

Thomas, 84-9 W. Hill Field Rd. #202, (Barnes Bank Bldg.), Layton,
Utah 84041, this / ^ ^

da

V

of

September, 1996, postage prepaid.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA BARBER,

HON. MICHAEL D. LYON
Plaintiffs),
Date: October 31, 1996

vs.

Case No. 924901656

SAM JOHN BARBER, JR.,
Defendant(s).

Dean Olsen, Reporter
Angela Taylor, Clerk

This is the time set for hearing on objection to the Commissioner's
recommendations. The plaintiff is present and represented by Robert Neeley. The
defendant is present and represented by Doug Thomas.
The parties have reached a settlement and the Mr. Neeley has signed the findings
and decree, approving them as to form.
The parties agree that the payments to the plaintiff for child support, alimony and
property settlement will be made in two equal installments. The automobile will be
returned to the defendant by November 30, 1996.
The court executes the findings and decree in open court.
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